Entry, exit, and imperfect competition in the long run

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Amir, R; Lambson, VE
• 署名单位: Brigham Young University; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00002-4
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 191-203
• 关键词: entry and exit; dynamic games; integer constraints

摘要

An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite-horizon equilibria. This equilibrium has a relatively simple structure characterized by two numbers per finite history. Under very general conditions, it tends to exhibit excessive entry and insufficient exit relative to a social optimum. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.