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作者：Köbberling, V; Peters, H
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：Bargaining problems are considered where the preferences of the bargainers deviate from expected utility but can be modelled according to rank-dependent utility theory. Under rank-dependent utility both the utility function and the probability weighting function influence the risk attitude of a decision maker. The same definition of risk aversion leads to two forms of risk aversion: utility risk aversion and probabilistic risk aversion. The main finding is that these two forms can have surpris...
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作者：Kamihigashi, T
作者单位：Kobe University
摘要：This paper shows stochastic versions of (i) Michel's (Econometrica 58 (1990) 705, Theorem 1) necessity result, (ii) a generalization of the TVC results of Weitzman (Management Sci, 19 (1973) 783) and Ekeland and Scheinkman (Math. Oper. Res. 11 (1986) 216), and (iii) Kamihigashi's (Econometrica 69 (2001) 995, Theorem 3.4) result, which is useful particularly in the case of homogeneous returns. These stochastic extensions are established for an extremely general stochastic reduced-form model tha...
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作者：Hintermaier, T
摘要：Bennett and Farmer (J. Econ. Theory 93 (2000) 118) claim that the degree of increasing returns to scale required for indeterminacy in a single sector growth model can be lowered by allowing for preferences that are non-separable in consumption and leisure. In this paper I show that the example they give violates concavity. In a more general setup, which does not impose specific functional forms on utility, I prove that there are no concave utility functions compatible with indeterminacy if the...
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作者：Haile, PA
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：When an auction is followed by an opportunity for resale, bidder valuations are endogenously determined, reflecting anticipated profit from buying/selling in the resale market. These valuations vary with the resale market structure, can differ across auction types, and may be lower or higher than if resale were impossible. Although resale introduces a common value element to the model, revenue equivalence can hold; when it fails, this is due not to affiliation but to differences in information...
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作者：Krishna, V
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：This paper studies equilibria of the n-bidder single-object English, or open ascending price, auction in a setting with interdependent values and asymmetric bidders. Maskin (in: H. Siebert (Ed.), Privatization, Institut fur Weltwirtschaften der Universitat Kiel, Kiel, 1992, pp. 115-136.) showed that if the values satisfy a single crossing condition, then the two-bidder English auction has an efficient equilibrium. In this paper, two extensions of the single crossing condition, the average cros...
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作者：Bullard, J; Smith, BD
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We study an economy in which intermediaries have incentives to issue circulating liabilities as part of an equilibrium. We show that, with arbitrarily small transactions costs, only the liabilities of intermediaries will circulate, and not those of other private sector agents. Therefore, our model connects intermediation activity with the issuance of payments media, a connection that has not been made in earlier literature. We use our model to suggest a resolution of the banknote underissue pu...
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作者：Zhou, RL
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：Previous studies have shown that a random-matching model with divisible fiat money and without constraint on agents' money inventories possesses a continuum of stationary single-price equilibria. Wallace (J. Econom. Theory 81 (1998) 223) conjectures that the indeterminacy can be eliminated by the use of commodity money. Instead, I find that in a similar random-matching model with dividend-yielding commodity money, a continuum of stationary singleprice equilibria exists when the utility of divi...
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作者：Goenka, A
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：This paper examines the effect of 'leakage' of information, private information becoming available to uninformed traders at a later date, on information acquisition and revelation. Using a Shapley-Shubik market game framework it is shown that (a) if information acquisition by the informed traders is costless, this leads to faster revelation of information; (b) if information acquisition is costly, there may be no acquisition of information; (c) information leakage leads to a fall in value of i...
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作者：Fishman, A; Rob, R
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Bar Ilan University
摘要：We develop a model of firm size, based on the hypothesis that consumers are locked in, because of search costs, with firms they have patronized in the past. As a consequence, older firms have a larger clientele and are able to extract higher profits. The equilibrium of this model yields: (i) A downward sloping density of firm sizes. (ii) Older firms are less likely to exit than younger firms. (iii) Larger firms spend more on RD. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Keller, G; Oldale, A
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper presents a model of a sequential search process for the best outcome of many multi-stage projects. The branching structure of the search environment is such that the payoffs to various actions are correlated; nevertheless, it is shown that the optimal strategy is given by a simple reservation price rule. (C) 2003 Published by Elsevier Science (USA).
