Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Koessler, F
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CY Cergy Paris Universite
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00036-X
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 393-399
• 关键词: strategic information revelation; Persuasion games; higher-order uncertainty; provability

摘要

Shin (J. Econom. Theory 64 (1994) 253-264) showed that a perfectly revealing equilibrium fails to exist in persuasion games when the decision maker is uncertain about the interested party's payoff-relevant information. By explicitly integrating higher-order uncertainty into the information structure, this note shows that a perfectly revealing equilibrium does exist when disclosures are not restrained to intervals of the payoff-relevant state space. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.