Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fieseler, K; Kittsteiner, T; Moldovanu, B
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00109-1
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 223-234
• 关键词: efficient trade; lemons; partnerships

摘要

We analyze the possibility of efficient trade with informationally interdependent valuations and with a dispersed ownership. A main role is played by the effects of adverse selection on incentive payments and budget constraints. Variations in the degree of interdependence directly influence the incentive payments and ultimately lead to a tightening or relaxation of the budget constraint, thus affecting the ability to achieve efficient trade. We derive precise possibility conditions for efficient trade, and we offer a framework in which the interplay of insights previously obtained by Akerlof (Quart. J. Econom. 89 (1970) 488), Myerson and Satterthwaite (J. Econom. Theory 28 (1983) 265), and Cramton et al. (Econometrica 55 (1987) 615) can be analyzed. In addition, we discuss to what extent possibility results previously obtained for private values environments can be generalized. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.