Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kovalenkov, A; Wooders, M
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00003-6
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 87-120
• 关键词: Cooperative games; clubs; approximate cores; effective small groups; parameterized collections of games; NTU games

摘要

We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied to a new model of an economy with clubs. In contrast to the extant literature, our approach allows both widespread externalities and uniform results. A fundamental new mathematical result, the partition-balancing effect of large numbers, which promises to have further applications, is contained in Appendix A. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.