Coase theorem, complexity and transaction costs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lee, Jihong; Sabourian, Hamid
• 署名单位: University of London; University of Cambridge
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.014
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 214-235
• 关键词: Coase theorem; EFFICIENCY; bargaining; Repeated game; Transaction cost; complexity; bounded rationality; automaton

摘要

This paper, by introducing complexity considerations, provides a dynamic foundation for the Coase theorem and highlights the role of transaction costs in generating inefficient bargaining/negotiation outcomes. We show, when the players have a preference for less complex strategies, the Coase theorem holds in negotiation models with repeated surplus and endogenous disagreement payoffs if and only if there are no transaction costs. Specifically, complexity considerations select only efficient equilibria in these models without transaction costs while every equilibrium induces perpetual disagreement and inefficiency with transaction costs. We also show the latter is true in the Rubinstein bargaining model with transaction costs. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.