Deliberative voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gerardi, Dino; Yariv, Leeat
• 署名单位: Yale University; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 317-338
• 关键词: communication; collective choice; juries; strategic voting

摘要

We analyze a model of jury decision making in which jurors deliberate before casting their votes. We consider a wide range of voting institutions and show that deliberations render these equivalent with respect to the sequential equilibrium outcomes they generate. In particular, in the context of a jury setup, all voting rules excluding the two types of unanimity rules (one requiring a unanimous consensus to acquit, one requiring a unanimous consensus to convict) induce the same set of equilibria outcomes. We show the robustness of our results with respect to several restrictions on communication protocols and jurors' strategies. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our observations extend to practically all of the voting structures commonly studied in the voting literature. The paper suggests the importance of accounting for communication in models of collective choice. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.