Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cripps, Martin W.; Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Washington University (WUSTL); University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.007
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 287-316
• 关键词: Reputation; imperfect monitoring; repeated games; COMMITMENT; private beliefs

摘要

For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps et al. [Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations, Econometrica 72 (2004) 407-432] showed that an informed player facing short-lived uninformed opponents cannot maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that is not part of an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty over types. This paper extends that result to games in which the uninformed player is long-lived and has private beliefs, so that the informed player's reputation is private. The rate at which reputations disappear is uniform across equilibria and reputations also disappear in sufficiently long discounted finitely repeated games. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.