Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Van Zandt, Timothy; Vives, Xavier
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.009
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 339-360
• 关键词: Supermodular games; incomplete information; first-order stochastic dominance; cournot tatonnement; monotone comparative statics; voluntary disclosure; local network effects; global games

摘要

For Bayesian games of strategic complementarities, we provide a constructive proof of the existence of a greatest and a least Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each one in strategies that are monotone in type. Our main assumptions, besides strategic complementarities, are that each player's payoff displays increasing differences in own action and the profile of types and that each player's interim beliefs are increasing in type with respect to first-order stochastic dominance (e.g., types are affiliated). The result holds for general action and type spaces (single-, multi-, or infinite-dimensional; continuous or discrete) and no prior is assumed. We also provide the following comparative statics result: the greatest and least equilibria are higher if there is a first-order stochastic dominant shift in the interim beliefs. We apply this result to strategic information revelation in games of voluntary disclosure. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.