Mixed bundling auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jehiel, Philippe; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz; Moldovanu, Benny
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 494-512
• 关键词: mixed bundling; auction; revenue maximization

摘要

We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.