A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Yamamoto, Yuichi
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.005
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 802-824
• 关键词: Repeated game; private monitoring; Almost-perfect monitoring; Belief-free equilibrium; characterization

摘要

The present paper studies repeated games with private monitoring, and characterizes the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in the limit as the discount factor approaches one and the noise on private information vanishes. Contrary to the conjecture by Ely et al. [J.C. Ely, J. Mmer, W. Olszewski, Belief-free equilibria in repeated games, Econometrica 73 (2005) 377-415], the equilibrium payoff set is computed by the same formula, no matter how many players there are. As an application of this result, a version of the folk theorem is established for N-player prisoner's dilemma games. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.