Sequential contracting with multiple principals

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pavan, Alessandro; Calzolari, Giacomo
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; University of Bologna
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.07.003
• 发表日期: 2009
• 页码: 503-531
• 关键词: Sequential common agency; mechanism design; CONTRACTS; Endogenous types

摘要

This paper considers dynamic games in which multiple principals contract sequentially and noncooperatively with the same agent. We first show that when contracting is private, i.e. when downstream principals do not observe the mechanisms offered upstream and the decisions taken in these mechanisms, all PBE outcomes can be characterized through pure-strategy profiles in which the principals offer menus of contracts and delegate to the agent the choice of the contractual terms. We then show that, in most cases of interest for applications, the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes is further facilitated fly the fact that the principals can be restricted to offer incentive-compatible extended direct mechanisms in which the agent reports the endogenous payoff-relevant decisions contracted upstream in addition to his exogenous private information. Finally we show how the aforementioned results must be adjusted to accommodate alternative assumptions about the observability of upstream histories and/or the timing of contracting examined in the literature. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.