-
作者：Dietrich, Franz
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like if a then b are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and compl...
-
作者：Dokow, Elad; Holzman, Ron
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position (yes/no) on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations, i.e., permissible combinations of positions on the issues. This framework for the theory of aggregation was introduced by Wilson and further developed by Rubinstein and Fishburn. Among other things, it admits the modeling of preference aggregation (wher...
-
作者：Bikhchandani, Sushil
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：It is well known that when agents' types are correlated, the mechanism designer can extract the entire surplus. This creates an incentive for agents to acquire information about other agents' types. Robust lotteries (are payment schemes that) support full extraction and partially robust lotteries support efficient implementation in the presence of information acquisition opportunities. Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of robust and partially robust lotteries are derived. If an...
-
作者：Britz, Volker; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：We study a model of non-cooperative multilateral unanimity bargaining on a full-dimensional payoff set. The probability distribution with which the proposing player is selected in each bargaining round follows an irreducible Markov process. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with an exogenous probability and the next round starts with the complementary probability. As the risk of exogenous breakdown vanishes, stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to the weight...
-
作者：Shneyerov, Artyom; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Concordia University - Canada; Concordia University - Canada; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. A friction parameter is tau, the length of the time period until the next meeting. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the convergence of mechanism outcomes to perfect competition at the linear rate in tau, which is shown to be the fastest possible among all bargaining mechanisms. The condition requires that buyers and sellers always ...
-
作者：Khanna, Naveen; Schroder, Mark
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business
摘要：We show how competition in oligopolies, with the possibility of failure and exit of a levered incumbent, affects the ex-ante design of optimal debt contracts. When a levered firm's profits are unobservable, a debt contract imposes the threat of nonrenewal to induce truthful revelation. Because nonrenewal impacts the future profitability of the surviving competitor, the contract influences the competitor's pricing strategy and the equilibrium profits of both firms. The optimal contract is quite...
-
作者：Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：I investigate whether a large community can sustain cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma by having cheaters punished not by their victims but by third parties. In the setting where players can observe their partners' past play only, I show that cooperation can be sustained by an equilibrium that has the following two properties: players choose their actions independently of their own past play, and they are indifferent between cooperation and defection at all histories. This equilibr...
-
作者：Albrecht, James; Anderson, Axel; Vroman, Susan
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop is made by a committee and show that a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium exists given a log concave distribution of rewards. We compare search by committee to the corresponding single-agent problem and show that committee members are less picky and more conservative than the single agent. We show how (i) increasing committee size holding the plurality fraction constant and (ii) increasing the plurality rule affect the...
-
作者：Jouini, Elyes; Marin, Jean-Michel; Napp, Clotilde
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Universite de Montpellier; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：Agents impatience rate and their anticipations about the future of the economy, are two essential determinants of the equilibrium discount rate, as illustrated by the Ramsey formula. Heterogeneity in time preference rates and in anticipations is widely acknowledged. Our objective is to determine the equilibrium discount rate when this heterogeneity is taken into account. Among others we tackle the following questions: As an additional risk or uncertainty, can dispersion in agents characteristi...
-
作者：Gizatulina, Alia; Hellwig, Martin
作者单位：Max Planck Society
摘要：For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents' payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs. The contrary result of Neeman [Z. Neeman, The relevance of private information in mechanism design, J. Econ. Theory 117 (2004) 55-77] rest...
