Information acquisition and full surplus extraction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bikhchandani, Sushil
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.08.003
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 2282-2308
• 关键词: Full surplus extraction; information acquisition; mechanism design

摘要

It is well known that when agents' types are correlated, the mechanism designer can extract the entire surplus. This creates an incentive for agents to acquire information about other agents' types. Robust lotteries (are payment schemes that) support full extraction and partially robust lotteries support efficient implementation in the presence of information acquisition opportunities. Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of robust and partially robust lotteries are derived. If an agent's information signal spans other agents' types then robust lotteries do not exist. However, if all agents report their signal realizations then robust lotteries exist in an extended type space. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.