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作者：Duffie, Darrell; Malamud, Semyon; Manso, Gustavo
作者单位：Stanford University; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We calculate learning rates when agents are informed through public and private observation of other agents' actions. We characterize the evolution of the distribution of posterior beliefs. If the private learning channel is present, convergence of the distribution of beliefs to the perfect-information limit is exponential at a rate equal to the sum of the mean arrival rate of public information and the mean rate at which individual agents are randomly matched with other agents. If, however, t...
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作者：Molzon, Robert; Puzzello, Daniela
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Kentucky
摘要：Random matching is often used in economic models as a means of introducing uncertainty in sequential decision problems. We show that random matching processes that satisfy standard proportionality laws are not unique. We give conditions on the payoffs and transition functions of sequential decision models that insure that economic models are robust to the nonuniqueness of the matching process. Under these conditions, the information contained in the proportionality laws is all that is needed t...
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作者：Stockman, David R.
作者单位：University of Delaware
摘要：Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [11] illustrate that a balanced-budget rule can lead to aggregate instability. In particular, under such a rule it is possible for a steady state to be locally indeterminate, and therefore sunspot equilibria are possible. In this paper, I extend their analysis to investigate the possibility of chaotic equilibria under a balanced-budget rule. A global analysis reveals Euler equation branching which means that the dynamics going forward are generated by a differential inc...
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作者：Barbera, Salvador; Berga, Dolors; Moreno, Bernardo
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics; Universitat de Girona; Universidad de Malaga
摘要：A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. We provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all ru...
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作者：Marinacci, Massimo; Montrucchio, Luigi
作者单位：Bocconi University; University of Turin; University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto
摘要：We study unique and globally attracting solutions of a general nonlinear stochastic equation, widely used in Finance and Macroeconomics and closely related to stochastic Koopmans equations. The equation is specified by a temporal aggregator W and a certainty equivalent operator M. The main contribution of the paper is the introduction of the new class of Thompson aggregators. Other contributions of the paper are: (i) a detailed analysis of quasi-arithmetic operators M that generalize those of ...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; de Clippel, Geoffroy
作者单位：Brown University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing different coalitional games when bargaining over multiple independent issues. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Araujo, Aloisio; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation; Instituto Nacional de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (IMPA)
摘要：This paper studies a class of one-dimensional screening problems where the agent's utility function does not satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees condition (SMC). The strength of the SMC for hidden information problems is to provide a full characterization of implementable contracts using only the local incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. These constraints are equivalent to the monotonicity of the decision variable with respect to the agent's unobservable one-dimensional parameter. When the SMC i...
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作者：Brandenburger, Adam; Friedenberg, Amanda
作者单位：New York University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：Best-response sets (Pearce, 1984 [28]) characterize the epistemic condition of rationality and common belief of rationality. When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler, 2008 [17]) characterizes rationality and common assumption of rationality. We analyze the behavior of SAS's in some games of interest-Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then estab...
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作者：Dokow, Elad; Holzman, Ron
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：A general model of aggregation of binary evaluations over interrelated issues, introduced by Wilson and further studied by Rubinstein and Fishburn and by the authors, is extended here to allow for abstentions on some of the issues. It is shown that the same structural conditions on the set of feasible evaluations that lead to dictatorship in the model without abstentions, lead to oligarchy in the presence of abstentions. Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions, Gibbard's oli...
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作者：Peress, Joel
作者单位：INSEAD Business School
摘要：The production of information in financial markets is limited by the extent of risk sharing. The wider a stock's investor base, the smaller the risk borne by each shareholder and the less valuable information. A firm which expands its investor base without raising capital affects its information environment through three channels: (i) it induces incumbent shareholders to reduce their research effort as a result of improved risk sharing, (ii) it attracts potentially informed investors, and (iii...
