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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico; Shmaya, Eran
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the behavioral definition of complementary goods: if the price of one good increases, demand for a complementary good must decrease. We obtain its full implications for observable demand behavior (its testable implications), and for the consumer's underlying preferences. We characterize those data sets which can be generated by rational preferences exhibiting complementarities. The class of preferences that generate demand complements has Leontief and Cobb Douglas as its as extreme me...
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作者：Cuong Le Van; Schubert, Katheline; Tu Anh Nguyen
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; University of Exeter
摘要：This paper studies the optimal growth of a developing non-renewable natural resource producer. It extracts the resource, and produces a single consumption good with man-made capital. Moreover, it can sell the extracted resource abroad and use the revenues to buy an imported good, perfect substitute of the domestic consumption good. The domestic technology is convex concave, so that the economy may be locked into a poverty trap. We show that the extent to which the country will escape from the ...
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作者：Aruoba, S. Boragan; Chugh, Sanjay K.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We study optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an environment where explicit frictions give rise to valued money, making money essential in the sense that it expands the set of feasible trades. Our main results are in stark contrast to the prescriptions of earlier flexible-price Ramsey models. Two especially important findings emerge from our work: the Friedman Rule is typically not optimal and inflation is stable over time. Inflation is not a substitute instrument for a missing tax, as is som...
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作者：Mondria, Jordi
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper models the attention allocation of portfolio investors. Investors choose the composition of their information subject to an information flow constraint. Given their expected investment strategy in the next period, which is to hold a diversified portfolio, in equilibrium investors choose to observe one linear combination of asset payoffs as a private signal. When investors use this private signal to update information about two assets, changes in one asset affect both asset prices an...
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作者：Renou, Ludovic; Schlag, Karl H.
作者单位：University of Leicester; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider price-setting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004) [4]). (C) 2009...
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作者：Lamy, Laurent
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：We find an error in [H. Cai, J. Riley, L. Ye, Reserve price signaling, J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253268]. The existence of the separating signaling equilibrium is not challenged, but the related comparative statics, while valid in the case without informational externalities between bidders, do not generalize to the case with informational externalities as claimed by the authors. General results on the influence of the number of bidders are obtained in a linear specification of the inform...
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作者：Nehring, Klaus; Puppe, Clemens
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We study the judgment aggregation problem from the perspective of justifying a particular collective decision by a corresponding aggregation on the criteria. In particular, we characterize the logical relations between the decision and the criteria that enable justification of a majority decision through a proposition-wise aggregation rule with no veto power on the criteria. While the well-studied doctrinal paradox provides a negative example in which no such justification exists, we show that...
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作者：Dana, R. A.; Le Van, C.
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; University of Exeter; Paris School of Economics
摘要：The theory of existence of equilibrium with short-selling is reconsidered under risk and ambiguity modelled by risk averse variational preferences. No-arbitrage conditions are given in terms of risk adjusted priors. A sufficient condition for existence of efficient allocations is the overlapping of the interiors of the risk adjusted sets of priors or the inexistence of mutually compatible trades, with non-negative expectation with respect to any risk adjusted prior. These conditions are necess...
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作者：Matsushima, Hitoshi; Miyazaki, Koichi; Yagi, Nobuyuki
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Tokyo
摘要：We investigate the adverse selection problem where a principal delegates multiple tasks to an agent. We characterize the virtually implementable social choice functions by using the linking mechanism proposed by Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) [20] that restricts the message spaces. The principal does not require any incentive wage schemes and can therefore avoid any information rent and welfare loss. We show the resemblance between the functioning of this message space restriction and that of...
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作者：Burdett, Ken; Coles, Melvyn
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Essex
摘要：This paper investigates equilibria where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk averse workers search for new job opportunities whether employed or unemployed. We generalize previous work by assuming firms have different productivities. Equilibrium implies more productive firms always offer more desirable contracts. Thus workers never quit from more productive firms for less productive firms. Nevertheless turnover is inefficient as employees with long tenures at low productivity firms may r...
