Search by committee

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Albrecht, James; Anderson, Axel; Vroman, Susan
• 署名单位: Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.011
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1386-1407
• 关键词: search; voting; committees

摘要

We consider the problem of sequential search when the decision to stop is made by a committee and show that a unique symmetric stationary equilibrium exists given a log concave distribution of rewards. We compare search by committee to the corresponding single-agent problem and show that committee members are less picky and more conservative than the single agent. We show how (i) increasing committee size holding the plurality fraction constant and (ii) increasing the plurality rule affect the equilibrium acceptance threshold and expected search duration. Finally, we show that unanimity is optimal if committee members are sufficiently patient. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.