The possibility of judgment aggregation on agendas with subjunctive implications

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Dietrich, Franz
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.11.003
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 603-638
• 关键词: Judgment aggregation; Subjunctive implication; Material implication; Characterisation of possibility agendas

摘要

The new field of judgment aggregation aims to find collective judgments on logically interconnected propositions. Recent impossibility results establish limitations on the possibility to vote independently on the propositions. I show that, fortunately, the impossibility results do not apply to a wide class of realistic agendas once propositions like if a then b are adequately modelled, namely as subjunctive implications rather than material implications. For these agendas, consistent and complete collective judgments can be reached through appropriate quota rules (which decide propositions using acceptance thresholds). I characterise the class of these quota rules. I also prove an abstract result that characterises consistent aggregation for arbitrary agendas in a general logic. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.