Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Britz, Volker; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Predtetchinski, Arkadi
• 署名单位: Maastricht University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.003
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 1951-1967
• 关键词: Nash bargaining solution; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Stationary strategies; Markov Process

摘要

We study a model of non-cooperative multilateral unanimity bargaining on a full-dimensional payoff set. The probability distribution with which the proposing player is selected in each bargaining round follows an irreducible Markov process. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with an exogenous probability and the next round starts with the complementary probability. As the risk of exogenous breakdown vanishes, stationary subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs converge to the weighted Nash bargaining solution with the stationary distribution of the Markov process as the weight vector. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.