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作者：Grabiszewski, Konrad
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：Type space is of fundamental importance in epistemic game theory. This paper shows how to build type space if players approach the game in a way advocated by Bernheim's justification procedure. If an agent fixes a strategy profile of her opponents and ponders which of their beliefs about her set of strategies make this profile optimal, such an analysis is represented by kernels and yields disintegrable beliefs. Our construction requires that underlying space is Polish. (C) 2010 Elsevier Inc. A...
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作者：Thijssen, Jacco J. J.
作者单位：University of York - UK
摘要：In this paper a two-player real option game with a first-mover advantage is analyzed, where payoffs are driven by a player-specific stochastic state variable. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium which has qualitatively different properties from those in standard real option games driven by common stochastic shocks. The properties of the equilibrium are four-fold: (i) preemption does not necessarily occur, (ii) if preemption takes place, the rent-equalization property holds, (iii) for ...
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作者：Hu, Audrey; Matthews, Steven A.; Zou, Liang
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Tinbergen Institute; University of Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We analyze the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first- and second-price auctions in the classic setting of symmetric and independent private values. We show that the seller's optimal reserve price decreases in his own risk aversion, and more so in the first-price auction. The reserve price also decreases in the buyers' risk aversion in the first-price auction. Thus, greater risk aversion increases ex post efficiency in both auctions - especially that of the first-price auction. At ...
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作者：Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper considers the robustness of equilibria to a small amount of incomplete information, where players are allowed to have heterogeneous priors. An equilibrium of a complete information game is robust to incomplete information under non-common priors if for every incomplete information game where each player's prior assigns high probability on the event that the players know at arbitrarily high order that the payoffs are given by the complete information game, there exists a Bayesian Nas...
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作者：Jean, Kasie; Rabinovich, Stanislav; Wright, Randall
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Green and Zhou relax the assumption, made in early search-based models of monetary exchange, of indivisible money. Their paper and various extensions make much technical progress, and derive some interesting substantive results. In particular, they show there is ail indeterminacy of steady-state monetary equilibria. We reconsider this result in the framework of Lagos and Wright, which is more tractable. We show that a similar multiplicity arises, and is much easier to derive and understand. We...
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作者：Ressner, Ludwig; Liski, Matti; Montero, Juan-Pablo
作者单位：University of Munich; Aalto University; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
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作者：Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：North Carolina State University
摘要：One of the oldest matching problems is Gale and Shapley's (1962) [81 roommates problem: is there a stable way to assign 2N students into N roommate pairs? Unlike the classic marriage problem or college admissions problem, there need not exist a stable solution to the roommates problem. However, stability ignores the key physical constraint that roommates require a room and is therefore too restrictive. This motivates a new matching problem: matching agents subject to an initial assignment. A p...
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作者：Ehlers, Lars; Erdil, Aytek
作者单位：University of Oxford; Universite de Montreal
摘要：A widespread practice in assignment of heterogeneous indivisible objects is to prioritize some recipients over others depending on the type of the object. Leading examples include assignment of public school seats, and allocation of houses, courses, or offices. Each object comes with a coarse priority ranking over recipients. Respecting such priorities constrains the set of feasible assignments, and therefore might lead to inefficiency, highlighting a tension between respecting priorities and ...
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作者：Ivanov, Maxim
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：This paper investigates communication between an informed expert and an uninformed principal via a strategic mediator. We demonstrate that, for any bias in the parties' preferences, there exists a strategic mediator that provides the highest expected payoff to the principal, as if the players had communicated through an optimal non-strategic mediator. (C) 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Ochs, Jack; Park, In-Uck
作者单位：University of Bristol; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We analyze a multi-period entry game among privately informed agents who differ with respect to the number of agents who must enter in order for their own entry to be profitable. In each period agents who have not yet joined decide whether to subscribe to a network. There exists a unique equilibrium that approximates any symmetric equilibrium arbitrarily closely as the discount factor approaches one. This resolves the coordination problem. Ex-post efficiency is necessarily achieved asymptotica...
