Aggregation of binary evaluations

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Dokow, Elad; Holzman, Ron
• 署名单位: Technion Israel Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.10.004
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 495-511
• 关键词: aggregation; Arrow's impossibility; JUDGMENT; logic; social choice

摘要

We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its position (yes/no) on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members of the society on those issues. There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations, i.e., permissible combinations of positions on the issues. This framework for the theory of aggregation was introduced by Wilson and further developed by Rubinstein and Fishburn. Among other things, it admits the modeling of preference aggregation (where the issues are pairwise comparisons and feasibility reflects rationality), and of judgment aggregation (where the issues are propositions and feasibility reflects logical consistency). We characterize those sets of feasible evaluations for which the natural analogue of Arrow's impossibility theorem holds true in this framework. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.