-
作者：Dybvig, Philip H.; Liu, Hong
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Retirement flexibility and inability to borrow against future labor income can significantly affect optimal consumption and investment. With voluntary retirement, there exists an optimal wealth-to-wage ratio threshold for retirement and human capital correlates negatively with the stock market even when wages have zero or slightly positive market risk exposure. Consequently, investors optimally invest more in the stock market than without retirement flexibility. Both consumption and portfolio ...
-
作者：Bond, Philip; Eraslan, Huelya
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study the possibility of trade for purely informational reasons. We depart from previous analyses (notably Grossman and Stiglitz 1980 and Milgrom and Stokey 1982) by allowing the final payoff of the asset being traded to depend on an action taken by its eventual owner. A leading example is the trade of a controlling stake in a corporation. We characterize conditions under which equilibria with trade exist. We discuss implications for when trade occurs, the correlation of actions with trade,...
-
作者：Menzio, Guido; Shi, Shouyong
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a general stochastic model of directed search on the job. Directed search allows its to focus on a Block Recursive Equilibrium (BRE.) where agents value functions, policy functions and market tightness do not depend on the distribution of workers over wages and unemployment. We formally prove existence of a BRE under various specifications of workers' preferences and contractual environments, including dynamic contracts and fixed-wage contracts. Solving a BRE is as easy as solving a...
-
作者：Bagh, Adib
作者单位：University of Kentucky; University of Kentucky
摘要：We introduce a notion of variational convergence for sequences of games and we show that the Nash equilibrium map is upper semi-continuous with respect to variationally converging sequences. We then show that for a game G with discontinuous payoff, some of the most important existence results of Dasgupta and Maskin, Simon, and Reny are based on constructing approximating sequences of games that variationally converge to G. In fact, this notion of convergence will help simplify these results an...
-
作者：Yared, Pierre
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：In every period, an aggressive country seeks concessions from a non-aggressive country with private information about their cost. The aggressive country can force concessions via war, and both countries suffer from limited commitment. We characterize the efficient sequential equilibria. We show that war is necessary to sustain peace and that temporary wars can emerge because of the coarseness of public information. In the long run, temporary wars can be sustained only if countries are patient,...
-
作者：Dietrich, Franz; Mongin, Philippe
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In the framework of judgment aggregation, we assume that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and that both Independence (formula-wise aggregation) and Unanimity Preservation hold for them. Whether premiss-based aggregation thus defined is compatible with conclusion-based aggregation, as defined by Unanimity Preservation on the non-premisses, depends on how the premisses are logically connected, both among themselves and with other formulas. We state necessary and sufficie...
-
作者：Chakraborty, Archishman; Citanna, Alessandro; Ostrovsky, Michael
作者单位：Stanford University; York University - Canada; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We introduce and study two-sided matching with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. An example of such a setting is a matching market between colleges and students in which colleges receive partially informative signals about students. Stability in such markets depends on the amount of information about matchings available to colleges. When colleges observe the entire matching, a stable matching mechanism does not generally exist. When colleges observ...
-
作者：Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：Stanford University; Stanford University
摘要：We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom [20], and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that the bilateral substitutes condition is a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework. However, the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition, and there does not necessarily exist a doctor-optimal stable allocation. Under a slightly stronger condition, unilateral substi...
-
作者：Lentz, Rasmus
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In this paper, I characterize matching in an on-the-job search model with endogenous search intensity, heterogeneous workers and firms, and match surplus is shared between workers and firms through bargaining. I provide proof of existence and uniqueness of steady state equilibrium. Given equally efficient matched and unmatched search, the worker skill conditional distribution of firm productivity over matches is stochastically increasing (decreasing) in worker skill if the production function ...
-
作者：Beker, Pablo; Chattopadhyay, Subir
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of York - UK
摘要：We introduce a methodology for analysing infinite horizon economies with two agents, one good, and incomplete markets. We provide an example in which an agent's equilibrium consumption is zero eventually with probability one even if she has correct beliefs and is marginally more patient. We then prove the following general result: if markets are effectively incomplete forever then on any equilibrium path on which some agent's consumption is bounded away from zero eventually, the other agent's ...
