-
作者：Cabrales, Antonio; Gossner, Olivier; Serrano, Roberto
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Brown University
摘要：Consider agents who are heterogeneous in their preferences and wealth levels. These agents may acquire information prior to choosing an investment that has a property of no-arbitrage, and each piece of information bears a corresponding cost. We associate a numeric index to each information purchase (information-cost pair). This index describes the normalized value of the information purchase: it is the risk-aversion level of the unique CARA agent who is indifferent between accepting and reject...
-
作者：Nunez, Matias; Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Cyprus
摘要：We focus on the single-peaked domain and study the class of Generalized Approval Mechanisms (GAMs): First, players simultaneously select subsets of the outcome space and scores are assigned to each alternative; and, then, a given quantile of the induced score distribution is implemented. Our main finding is that essentially for every Nash-implementable welfare optimum including the Condorcet winner alternative there exists a GAM that Nash-implements it. Importantly, the GAM that Nash-implement...
-
作者：Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. To guide market designers faced with constraints, we propose new stability concepts. A matching is strongly stable if satisfying blocking pairs inevitably violates a constraint. We show that a strongly stable matching may not exist, and that existence is guaranteed if and only if all distributional constraints are trivial. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a more permissive concept, weak stability. We demonstrate a wea...
-
作者：Bella, Giovanni; Mattana, Paolo; Venturi, Beatrice
作者单位：University of Cagliari
摘要：This paper shows that chaotic dynamics and global indeterminacy may characterize the Lucas (1988) endogenous growth model in its local determinacy region of the parameter space. This is achieved by means of the Shilnikov (1965) theorem, which exploits the existence of a family of homoclinic orbits doubly asymptotic to the balanced growth path, when it is a saddle-focus. The economic implications of these results are also discussed. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Parakhonyak, Alexei; Parakhonyak, Anastasia
作者单位：University of Vienna; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of Oxford; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Reservation price equilibria (RPE) do not accurately assess market power in consumer search markets. In most search markets, consumers do not know important elements of the environment in which they search (such as, for example, firms' cost). We argue that when consumers learn when searching, RPE suffer from theoretical issues, such as non-existence and critical dependence on specific out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We characterize equilibria where consumers rationally choose search strategies tha...
-
作者：O'Brien, Daniel P.
摘要：An all-units discount is a price reduction applied to all units purchased if the customer's total purchases equal or exceed a given quantity threshold. Since the discount is paid on all units rather than marginal units, the tariff is discontinuous and exhibits a negative marginal price (cliff) at the threshold that triggers the discount. This paper shows that all-units discounts arise in optimal agency contracts between upstream and downstream firms that face double moral hazard. I present con...
-
作者：Trudeau, Christian; Vidal-Puga, Juan
作者单位：University of Windsor; Universidade de Vigo; Universidade de Vigo
摘要：Minimal cost spanning tree problems connect agents efficiently to a source when agents are located at different points and the cost of using an edge is fixed. We propose a method, based on the concept of marginal games, to generate all extreme points of the corresponding core. We show that three of the most famous solutions to share the cost of mcst problems, the Bird, folk and cycle-complete solutions, are closely related to our method. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Schoch, Daniel
作者单位：University of Nottingham Malaysia
摘要：We extend the classical mean-variance preference model underlying modern portfolio theory to include deviation measures (Rockafellar et al., 2006a). Deviation measures have characteristics similar to a norm, save that they are not symmetric. The significance of this study is given by the fact that the class of agents following a CAPM-like investment strategy with a certain deviation measure which is tantamount to always selecting a certain personal master portfolio can be described by having g...
-
作者：Kang, Kee-Youn
作者单位：Yonsei University
摘要：We construct a search theoretic model of money in which counterfeit money can be produced at a cost, but agents can screen for fake money, also at a cost. Counterfeiting can occur in equilibrium when both costs and the inflation rate are sufficiently low. Optimal monetary policy is the Friedman rule. However, the rationale for the Friedman rule in an economy with circulation of counterfeit money differs from the conventional mechanism that holds in the model when counterfeiting does not occur....
-
作者：Meroni, Claudia; Pimienta, Carlos
作者单位：University of Verona; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We show that many results on the structure and stability of equilibria in finite games extend to Poisson games. In particular, the set of Nash equilibria of a Poisson game consists of finitely many connected components and at least one of them contains a stable set (De Sinopoli et al., 2014). In a similar vein, we prove that the number of Nash equilibria in Poisson voting games under plurality, negative plurality, and (when there are at most three candidates) approval rule, as well as in Poiss...
