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作者：Samuelson, Larry; Stacchetti, Ennio
作者单位：Yale University; New York University
摘要：When are economic interactions mediated by prices and transfers, and when are they mediated by variations in the continuation payoffs within a relationship? To address this question, we examine a relationship between two players who periodically face opportunities to undertake randomly generated projects that impose a cost on one player and a benefit on the other, as well as opportunities to make voluntary transfers to one another. We characterize the set of equilibria, with particular emphasi...
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作者：Choi, Michael; Smith, Lones
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：When is the weighted sum of quasi-concave functions quasi-concave? We answer this, extending an analogous preservation of the single-crossing property in QS: Quah and Strulovici (2012). Our approach develops a general preservation of n-crossing properties, applying the variation diminishing property in Karlin (1956). The QS premise is equivalent to Karlin's total positivity of order two, while our premise uses total positivity of order three: The weighted sum of quasi-concave functions is quas...
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作者：Amir, Rabah; De Castro, Luciano
作者单位：University of Iowa
摘要：This paper proposes a new general class of strategic games and develops an associated new existence result for pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. For a two-player game with scalar and compact action sets, existence entails that one reaction curve be increasing and continuous and the other quasi-increasing (i.e., not have any downward jumps). The latter property amounts to strategic quasi-complementarities. The paper provides a number of ancillary results of independent interest, including suffici...
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作者：Hart, Sergiu; Nisan, Noam
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Maximizing the revenue from selling more than one good (or item) to a single buyer is a notoriously difficult problem, in stark contrast to the one-good case. For two goods, we show that simple one-dimensional mechanisms, such as selling the goods separately, guarantee at least 73% of the optimal revenue when the valuations of the two goods are independent and identically distributed, and at least 50% when they are independent. For the case of k > 2 independent goods, we show that selling them...
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作者：Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. Projects may differ in their value for the designer, and their cost is private information. In this allocation problem, the quantity of procured projects is endogenously determined by the mechanism. The designer faces ex-post constraints: the participation and budget constraints must hold for each possible outcome, while the mechanism must be strategyproof. We identify settings i...
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作者：Jewitt, Ian; Mukerji, Sujoy
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We investigate what it means for one act to be more ambiguous than another. The question is evidently analogous to asking what makes one prospect riskier than another, but beliefs are neither objective nor representable by a unique probability. Our starting point is an abstract class of preferences constructed to be (strictly) partially ordered by a more ambiguity averse relation. First, we define two notions of more ambiguous with respect to such a class. A more ambiguous (I) act makes an amb...
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作者：Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter A.; Wolthoff, Ronald P.
作者单位：Tongji University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; University of Toronto
摘要：In a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms, we analyze how the properties of the meeting technology affect the allocation of buyers to sellers. We show that a separate submarket for each type of buyer is the efficient outcome if and only if meetings are bilateral. In contrast, a single market with all agents is optimal if and only if the meeting technology satisfies a novel condition, which we call joint concavity. Both outcomes can be decentralized by ...
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作者：Dillenberger, David; Segal, Uzi
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Boston College; University of Warwick
摘要：We study the attitude of decision makers to skewed noise. For a binary lottery that yields the better outcome with probability p, we identify noise around p with a compound lottery that induces a distribution over the exact value of the probability and has an average value p. We propose and characterize a new notion of skewed distributions, and use a recursive non-expected utility to provide conditions under which rejection of symmetric noise implies rejection of negatively skewed noise, yet d...
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作者：Giannoni, Marc P.; Woodford, Michael
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; Columbia University
摘要：This paper considers a general class of nonlinear rational-expectations models in which policymakers seek to maximize an objective function that may be household expected utility. We show how to derive a target criterion that is: (i) consistent with the model's structural equations, (ii) strong enough to imply a unique equilibrium, and (iii) optimal, in the sense that a commitment to adjust the policy instrument at all dates so as to satisfy the target criterion maximizes the objective functio...
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作者：Cho, In-Koo; Matsui, Akihiko
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Hanyang University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper investigates the dynamic foundation of a competitive equilibrium, studying a sequence of random matching models between ex ante heterogeneous buyers and sellers under two-sided incomplete information with no entry, where each agent is endowed with non-transferable utility. The economy is populated with two sets of infinitesimal agents, buyers and sellers, who have private information about their own valuations of the object. In each period, buyers and sellers in the pool are matched...
