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作者：Kuzmics, Christoph; Steg, Jan-Henrik
作者单位：University of Graz; University of Bielefeld
摘要：Consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), ex-post individually rational (EPIR), and ex-post budget balanced (EPBB). It is well known that if there are only two agents, then any such mechanism must have a threshold (or fixed cost-sharing) form, providing the public good if and only if both agents have values that are at least their respective thresholds. When there are more than two agents, there are mechanisms that ...
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作者：Henderson, Vicky; Hobson, David; Tse, Alex S. L.
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of Oxford; University of Cambridge
摘要：When prospect theory (PT) is applied in a dynamic context, the probability weighting component brings new challenges. We study PT agents facing optimal timing decisions and consider the impact of allowing them to follow randomized strategies. In a continuous-time model of gambling and optimal stopping, Ebert and Strack (2015) show that a naive PT investor with access only to pure strategies never stops. We show that allowing randomization can significantly alter the predictions of their model,...
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作者：Condie, Scott; Ganguli, Jayant
作者单位：Brigham Young University; University of Essex
摘要：When private information is observed by ambiguity averse investors, asset prices may be informationally inefficient in rational expectations equilibrium. This inefficiency implies lower asset prices as uninformed investors require a premium to hold assets and higher return volatility relative to informationally efficient benchmarks. Moreover, asset returns are negatively skewed and may be leptokurtic. Inefficiency also leads to amplification in price of small changes in news, relative to infor...
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作者：Sun, Xiang; Sun, Yeneng; Wu, Lei; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：Wuhan University; National University of Singapore; University of Iowa
摘要：This paper considers three solution concepts in a large private information economy, namely, Walrasian expectations equilibrium, private core, and insurance equilibrium. It shows that these three concepts coincide with each other when the agents are informationally negligible in such an economy. In contrast to the finite-agent setting, one can construct a large private information economy in which incentive compatibility fails completely in the sense that almost every agent in any Walrasian ex...
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作者：Du, Songzi; Zhu, Haoxiang
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Existing models of divisible double auctions typically require three or more traders when there are two traders, the usual linear equilibria imply market breakdowns unless the traders' values are negatively correlated. This paper characterizes a family of nonlinear ex post equilibria in a divisible double auction with only two traders, who have interdependent values and submit demand schedules. The equilibrium trading volume is positive but less than the first best. Closed-form solutions are o...
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作者：Pupato, German
作者单位：Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：This paper introduces moral hazard into a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms to study wage inequality between homogeneous workers. Optimal performance pay contracts yield non-degenerate wage distributions among co-workers, enabling the analysis of two conceptually distinct and empirically relevant dimensions of wage dispersion: between-firm and within-firm inequality. The latter remains virtually unexplored in the literature. As an application, I characterize analytically the i...
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作者：Nikandrova, Arina; Pancs, Romans
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We consider a single-item, independent private value auction environment with two bidders: a leader, who knows his valuation, and a follower, who privately chooses how much to learn about his valuation. We show that, under some conditions, an ex-post efficient revenue-maximizing auction which solicits bids sequentially partially discloses the leader's bid to the follower, to influence his learning. The disclosure rule that emerges is novel; it may reveal to the follower only a pair of bids to ...
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作者：Auer, Raphael A.; Saure, Philip
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Swiss National Bank (SNB)
摘要：We develop a model of vertical innovation in which firms incur a market entry cost and choose a unique level of quality. Once established, firms compete for market shares, selling to consumers with heterogeneous tastes for quality. The equilibrium of the pricing game exists and is unique within our setup. Exogenous productivity growth induces firms to enter the market sequentially at the top end of the quality spectrum. A central feature of the model is that optimization problems of consecutiv...
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作者：Hui Ou-Yang; Wu, Weili
作者单位：Central University of Finance & Economics
摘要：In this paper, we correct part (b) of Theorem 6 of Grossman and Stiglitz (GS, 1980). We demonstrate that when the private signal tends to be perfect, the market converges to strong-form efficiency, and thus informed and uninformed traders have almost homogeneous beliefs about the stock payoff, but there is still significant net trade, rather than no trade as erroneously shown by GS. We further show that when the stock price becomes more informative, and thus traders' beliefs about the stock pa...
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作者：Obara, Ichiro; Park, Jaeok
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Yonsei University
摘要：In this paper, we introduce a general class of time discounting, which may exhibit present bias or future bias, to repeated games with perfect monitoring. A strategy profile is called an agent subgame perfect equilibrium if there is no profitable one-shot deviation by any player at any history. We study strongly symmetric agent subgame perfect equilibria for repeated games with a symmetric stage game. We find that the worst punishment equilibrium takes different forms for different types of bi...
