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作者：Schlag, Karl H.; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Glasgow
摘要：We study decision making in complex discrete-time dynamic environments where Bayesian optimization is intractable. A decision maker is equipped with a finite set of benchmark strategies. She aims to perform similarly to or better than each of these benchmarks. Furthermore, she cannot commit to any decision rule, hence she must satisfy this goal at all times and after every history. We find such a rule for a sufficiently patient decision maker and show that it necessitates not to rely too much ...
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作者：Alexandrov, Alexei; Bedre-Defolie, Oezlem
作者单位：Amazon.com; European School of Management & Technology
摘要：The LeChatelier-Samuelson principle states that, as a reaction to a shock, an agent's short-run adjustment of an affected action is smaller than its long-run adjustment (when the agent can also adjust other related actions). We extend the principle to strategic environments where the long-run adjustment also accounts for other players adjusting their strategies. We show that the principle holds for supermodular games (strategic complements) satisfying monotone comparative statics and provide s...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Takahashi, Satoru
作者单位：Yale University; Princeton University; National University of Singapore
摘要：We study agents whose expected utility preferences are interdependent for informational or psychological reasons. We characterize when two types can be strategically distinguished in the sense that they are guaranteed to behave differently in some finite mechanism. We show that two types are strategically distinguishable if and only if they have different hierarchies of interdependent preferences. The same characterization applies for rationalizability, equilibrium, and any interim solution co...
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作者：Peski, Marcin
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：We analyze a large roommate problem (i.e., marriage matching in which the marriage is not restricted solely to matchings between men and women) with non-transferable utility. It is well known that while a roommate problem may not have a stable proper matching, each roommate problem does have an stable improper matching. In a random utility model with types from Dagsvik (2000) and Menzel (2015), we show that all improper stable matchings are asymptotically close to being a proper stable matchin...
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作者：Parenti, Mathieu; Ushchev, Philip; Thisse, Jacques-Francois
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We propose a general model of monopolistic competition, which encompasses existing models while being flexible enough to take into account new demand and competition features. Even though preferences need not be additive and/or homothetic, the market outcome is still driven by the sole variable elasticity of substitution. We impose elementary conditions on this function to guarantee empirically relevant properties of a free-entry equilibrium. Comparative statics with respect to market size and...
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作者：Murto, Pauli; Valimaki, Juuso
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：This note analyzes different types of all-pay auctions when the number of bidders becomes large. We compute the distributions of the highest bids for the first-price all pay auction and we show that the expected payment made by the winning bidder converges to half of the total payments. In the second-price all-pay auction (the war of attrition), the highest bid amounts to about 35.5% of the total revenues. We also compute the payments for all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. (C) 2017 Elsevie...
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作者：Hayashi, Takashi; Lombardi, Michele
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：Consider a society with a finite number of sectors (social issues or commodities). In a partial equilibrium (PE) mechanism a sector authority (SA) aims to elicit agents' preference rankings for outcomes at hand, presuming separability of preferences, while such presumption is false in general and such isolated rankings might be artifacts. This paper studies what can be Nash implemented if we take such misspecification of PE analysis as a given institutional constraint. The objective is to unco...
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作者：Peck, James
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This paper demonstrates how equilibrium involving anticipated boycotts and actual boycotts can occur, even though consumers are negligible and only care about the price they pay and the timing of purchase. The model is a two-period durable goods monopoly game with demand uncertainty. First, a non-boycott equilibrium is characterized. Under regularity assumptions ruling out multiplicative uncertainty, there are additional equilibria in which the firm sets a low price in period 0, based on the a...
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作者：Manea, Mihai
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We establish the existence of steady states in two classic matching and bargaining models with general trader asymmetries, search processes, and production functions. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Perea, Andres
作者单位：Maastricht University; Maastricht University
摘要：All equilibrium concepts implicitly make a correct beliefs assumption, stating that a player believes that his opponents are correct about his first-order beliefs. In this paper we show that in many dynamic games of interest, this correct beliefs assumption may be incompatible with a very basic form of forward induction reasoning: the first two layers of extensive-form rationalizability (Pearce, 1984; Battigalli, 1997, epistemically characterized by Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002). Hence, fo...
