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作者：Burdett, Kenneth; Trejos, Alberto; Wright, Randall
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; INCAE Business School; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We propose a new search-theoretic model of monetary exchange with indivisible assets, based on price posting instead of bargaining, and incorporating noisy search. This yields some familiar results, plus a lot more. The model admits multiple steady states due to the self-referential nature of liquidity. It admits cyclic, chaotic and stochastic equilibria, and compared to bargaining versions, the dynamics are more general and have better microfoundations. It generates price dispersion, with int...
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作者：Irmen, Andreas; Tabakovic, Amer
作者单位：University of Luxembourg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Milan
摘要：The determinants of the direction of technical change and their implications for economic growth and economic policy are studied in the one-sector neoclassical growth model of Ramsey, Cass, and Koopmans extended to allow for endogenous capital- and labor-augmenting technical change. We build on a recently developed micro-foundation for the competitive production sector that rests on the idea that the fabrication of output requires tasks to be performed by capital and labor (Irmen, 2017). Firms...
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作者：Lleras, Juan Sebastian; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Nakajima, Daisuke; Ozbay, Erkut Y.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Otaru University of Commerce
摘要：There is well-established evidence that decision makers consistently fail to consider all available options. Instead, they restrict attention to only a subset of alternatives and then undertake a more detailed analysis of this reduced set. This systematic lack of consideration of available options can lead to a more is less effect, where excess of options can be welfare-reducing for a decision-maker (DM). Building on this idea, we model individuals who might pay attention to only a subset of t...
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作者：Laclau, Marie; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris
摘要：We consider repeated games with compact actions sets and pure strategies in which players commonly observe a public signal which reveals imperfectly the action profile. We characterize the set of payoffs profiles that can be sustained by a perfect equilibrium, as players become increasingly patient. There are two conditions: admissibility and joint rationality. An admissibly feasible payoff can be achieved by an action profile that offers no unilateral deviation which is both undetectable and ...
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作者：Hirata, Daisuke; Kasuya, Yusuke
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：This paper studies stable and (one-sided) strategy-proof rules in many-to-one matching markets with contracts. Not assuming any kind of substitutes condition or the law of aggregate demand, we obtain the following results. First, the number of stable and strategy-proof rules is at most one. Second, the doctor-optimal stable rule, whenever it exists, is the unique candidate for a stable and strategy-proof rule. Third, a stable and strategy-proof rule, whenever it exists, is second-best optimal ...
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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Ilkilic, Rahmi
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Universidad de Chile
摘要：We study a network of buyers and sellers where each seller owns an indivisible object and has no incentive to keep it, while each buyer has a downward sloping demand curve which is private information. Only the connected buyer-seller pairs can engage in trade. We search for trade mechanisms that are efficient, strategy-proof, bilateral trade stable and individually rational. In general, there does not exist a trade mechanism simultaneously satisfying these properties. The tension between strat...
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作者：Boleslavsky, Raphael; Kelly, David L.; Taylor, Curtis R.
摘要：We introduce a new market microstructure model to study a setting in which an authority (e.g. a firm manager or government policymaker) learns about the likelihood of a bad state by observing activity in the asset market, before deciding whether to undertake a costly intervention to improve the state. Intervention erodes the value of an investor's private information by weakening the link between the initial state and the asset payoff. Informed investors are reluctant to make large, informativ...
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作者：Kogan, Leonid; Ross, Stephen A.; Wang, Jiang; Westerfield, Mark M.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：The hypothesis that financial markets punish traders who make relatively inaccurate forecasts and eventually eliminate the effect of their beliefs on prices is of fundamental importance to the standard modeling paradigm in asset pricing. We establish straightforward necessary and sufficient conditions for agents to survive and to affect prices in the long run in a general setting with minimal restrictions on endowments, beliefs, or utility functions. We describe a new mechanism for the distinc...
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作者：Bowen, T. Renee; Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hulya; Zapal, Jan
作者单位：Stanford University; Johns Hopkins University; Rice University; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary institutions that determine the rules governing feasible allocations to mandatory and discretionary spending programs. Mandatory spending is enacted by law and remains in effect until changed, and thus induces an ...
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作者：Hedlund, Jonas
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：This paper introduces private sender information in a game of Bayesian persuasion with monotonic sender preferences. I derive properties of increasing differences related to the precision of signals and use these to characterize the set of equilibria selected by the D1 criterion. These equilibria are either separating (i.e., the sender's choice of signal reveals his private information to the receiver) or fully disclosing (i.e., the outcome of the sender's chosen signal fully reveals the payof...
