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作者：Yang, Yi-You
作者单位：Aletheia University
摘要：The maximal domain theorem by Gul and Stacchetti (1999) shows that for markets with indivisible objects, the set of gross substitutable preferences is a largest set for which the existence of a competitive equilibrium is guaranteed. In this paper, we give an example to show that a claim in their proof is false, and provide an alternative proof based on a new characterization of gross substitutability. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Nezafat, Mahdi; Schroder, Mark; Wang, Qinghai
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; State University System of Florida; University of Central Florida
摘要：During financial crises, financial market regulators often restrict short-selling to support prices and curb volatility. However, evidence suggests that short-selling bans during the turmoil in financial markets in 2007-2009 failed to achieve regulators' goals. We analyze a model of costly private information acquisition and asset pricing under short-sale constraints to examine a possible cause of this failure. We show that the constraints increase return volatility by adversely affecting the ...
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作者：Pejsachowicz, Leonardo; Toussaert, Severine
作者单位：Princeton University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In a standard model of menu choice, we examine the behavior of an agent who applies the following Cautious Deferral rule: Whenever in doubt, don't commit; just leave options open. Our primitive is a complete preference relation that represents the agent's choice behavior. The agent's indecisiveness is captured by means of a possibly incomplete (but otherwise rational) preference relation >=. We ask when can be viewed as a Cautious Deferral completion of some incomplete Under the independence a...
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作者：Bajaj, Ayushi; Hu, Tai-Wei; Rocheteau, Guillaume; Silva, Mario Rafael
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper offers two ways to decentralize the constrained-efficient allocation of the Lagos - Wright (2005) pure currency economy. The first way has divisible money, take-it-or-leave-it offers by buyers, and a transfer scheme financed by money creation. If agents are sufficiently patient, the first best is achieved for finite money growth rates. if agents are impatient, the equilibrium allocation approaches the constrained efficient allocation asymptotically as the money growth rate tends to ...
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作者：Fong, Yuk-fai; Li, Jin
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper studies a relational contracting model in which the agent is protected by a limited liability constraint. The agent's effort is his private information and affects output stochastically. We characterize the optimal relational contract and compare the dynamics of the relationship with that under the optimal long-term contract. Under the optimal relational contract, the relationship is less likely to survive, and the surviving relationship is less efficient. In addition, relationships...
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作者：Breu, Mariana Rojas
作者单位：Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：This paper presents a framework in which fiat money has value in equilibrium even though a risk-free higher-return asset can be equally used as a medium of exchange. In a limited-commitment environment, agents may prefer to borrow a low-return asset because that results in a larger borrowing capacity. Thus, a monetary equilibrium in which money is dominated in rate of return exists. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Arribas, I.; Urbano, A.
作者单位：University of Valencia; University of Valencia
摘要：This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. By analyzing a kind of extended contract schedule (mixed bundling prices), the paper shows that pure strategy efficient equilibria always exist in such settings. While inefficient equilibria may exist, this can be ruled out by refining the equilibrium correspondence using the co...
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作者：Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora
作者单位：Tilburg University; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：This paper studies information release in symmetric, independent private value auctions with multiple objects and unit demand. We compare effects on welfare to those on the seller's revenue. Applying the dispersive order, the previous literature could only identify settings in which welfare provides the stronger incentives for information release. We generalize the dispersive order to k- and k-m-dispersion. These new criteria allow us to systematically characterize situations in which revenue ...
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作者：Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Yale University
摘要：We analyze strategic experimentation in which information arrives through fully revealing, publicly observable breakdowns. When actions are hidden, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium that involves randomization over stopping times. With two players, this is the unique equilibrium. Randomization leads to dispersion in actions and to belief disagreement on the equilibrium path. The resulting lack of coordination has significant welfare consequences. In contrast, when actions are observa...
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作者：Nocke, Volker; Schutz, Nicolas
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Mannheim
摘要：Applied researchers often work with demand systems that do not depend on income, with the implicit assumption that preferences are quasi-linear and income sufficiently large. The classic approach to the integrability of demand does not readily apply in this case. Adopting a much simpler approach that is based on integrating the vector field defined by the demand system and on duality, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the quasi-linear integrability of such (continuous) demand ...
