The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Meroni, Claudia; Pimienta, Carlos
• 署名单位: University of Verona; University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.003
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 128-144
• 关键词: Poisson games; voting; Stable sets; Generic determinacy of equilibria; o-Minimal structures

摘要

We show that many results on the structure and stability of equilibria in finite games extend to Poisson games. In particular, the set of Nash equilibria of a Poisson game consists of finitely many connected components and at least one of them contains a stable set (De Sinopoli et al., 2014). In a similar vein, we prove that the number of Nash equilibria in Poisson voting games under plurality, negative plurality, and (when there are at most three candidates) approval rule, as well as in Poisson coordination games, is generically finite. As in finite games, these results are obtained exploiting the geometric structure of the set of Nash equilibria which, in the case of Poisson games, is shown to be semianalytic. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.