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作者：Bikhchandani, Sushil
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Two notions of stability, ex ante stability and Bayesian stability, are investigated in a matching model with non-transferrable utility, interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information. Ex ante stable matching-outcomes are unblocked for every belief on the blocking partner's type while Bayesian stable matching-outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior beliefs. Ex ante stability is a minimal requirement. Bayesian stability is a more selective desideratum with sound efficienc...
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作者：Casajus, Andre; Yokote, Koji
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management; Waseda University
摘要：The principle of differential marginality for cooperative games states that the differential of two players' payoffs does not change when the differential of these players' marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them does not change. Together with two standard properties, efficiency and the null player property, differential marginality characterizes the Shapley value. For games that contain more than two players, we show that this characterization can be improved by using ...
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作者：Erdil, Aytek; Ergin, Haluk
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Most of the two-sided matching literature maintains the assumption that agents are never indifferent between any two members of the opposite side. In practice, however, ties in preferences arise naturally and are widespread. Market design needs to handle ties carefully, because in the presence of indifferences, stability no longer implies Pareto efficiency, and the deferred acceptance algorithm cannot be applied to produce a Pareto efficient or a worker-optimal stable matching. We allow ties i...
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作者：Balmaceda, Felipe; Escobar, Juan F.
作者单位：Universidad de Chile
摘要：This paper studies which social networks maximize trust and welfare when agreements are implicitly enforced. We study a repeated trust game in which trading opportunities arise exogenously and a social network determines the information each player has. The main contribution of the paper is the characterization of optimal networks under alternative assumptions about how information flows across a network. When a defection is observed only by the victim's connections, cohesive networks are Pare...
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作者：Cerdeiro, Diego A.; Dziubinski, Marcin; Goyal, Sanjeev
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; University of Warsaw; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
摘要：Individuals derive benefits from their connections, but these may expose them to external threats. Agents therefore invest in security to protect themselves. What are the network architectures that maximize collective welfare? We propose a model to explore the tension between connectivity and exposure to an external threat when security choices are decentralized. We find that both over-investment and under-investment in security are possible, and that optimal network architectures depend on th...
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作者：Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：I analyze equilibria of a dynamic political agency model of elections with a two-period term limit in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. In equilibrium, office holders' policy choices are ordered by type; politicians exert positive effort in the first term of office; and as politicians become highly office motivated, the highest politician type mixes with positive probability between shirking and choosing arbitrarily high policies. Nevertheless, the commitment problem of voter...
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作者：Lu, Shih En
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：This paper characterizes generic equilibrium play in a multi-sender version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) cheap talk model, when robustness to a broad class of beliefs about noise in the senders' observation of the state is required. Just like in the one-sender model, information transmission is partial, equilibria have an interval form, and they can be computed through a generalized version of Crawford and Sobel's forward solution procedure. Fixing the senders' biases, full revelation is not...
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作者：Frankel, David M.
作者单位：Iowa State University
摘要：Distressed firms are vulnerable to inefficient panic-based runs of their workers, suppliers, and customers. A policymaker may try to prevent such a run by pledging to protect the interests of these stakeholders should a firm cease to do business. However, this promise also enables the firm to demand better terms of trade from its stakeholders, which blunts the policy's effectiveness. We show how to avoid such an adverse response by the use of partial, countercyclical insurance. Under certain c...
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作者：Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; Moen, Espen R.; Preugschat, Edgar
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; Dortmund University of Technology
摘要：This paper proposes an explicit model of spillovers through labor flows in a framework with search frictions. Firms can choose to innovate or to imitate by hiring a worker from a firm that has already innovated. We show that if innovating firms can commit to long-term wage contracts with their workers, productivity spillovers are fully internalized. If firms cannot commit to long-term wage contracts, there is too little innovation and too much imitation in equilibrium. Our model is tractable a...
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作者：Bryan, Kevin A.; Lemus, Jorge
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：How do innovation policies affect the direction of research? Is market-based innovation too radical or too incremental? We construct a novel and tractable model of the direction of innovation. Firms pursue inefficient research directions because they race to discover easy yet less valuable projects and because they work on difficult inventions where they can appropriate a larger portion of the social value. Fixing these inefficiencies requires policy to condition on properties of inventions th...
