Implementation via approval mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nunez, Matias; Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.05.003
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 169-181
• 关键词: Nash implementation; strategy-proofness; Approval voting; Single-peakedness; Condorcet winner

摘要

We focus on the single-peaked domain and study the class of Generalized Approval Mechanisms (GAMs): First, players simultaneously select subsets of the outcome space and scores are assigned to each alternative; and, then, a given quantile of the induced score distribution is implemented. Our main finding is that essentially for every Nash-implementable welfare optimum including the Condorcet winner alternative there exists a GAM that Nash-implements it. Importantly, the GAM that Nash-implements the Condorcet winner alternative is the first simple simultaneous game with this feature in the literature. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.