Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.006
发表日期：
2017
页码：
107-142
关键词：
摘要：
Many real matching markets are subject to distributional constraints. To guide market designers faced with constraints, we propose new stability concepts. A matching is strongly stable if satisfying blocking pairs inevitably violates a constraint. We show that a strongly stable matching may not exist, and that existence is guaranteed if and only if all distributional constraints are trivial. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a more permissive concept, weak stability. We demonstrate a weakly stable matching always exists, implies efficiency, and is characterized by standard normative axioms. These results are obtained in a more general environment than those in existing studies, accommodating a wide variety of applications. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.