-
作者：Stachurski, John; Zhang, Junnan
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：This paper extends the core results of discrete time infinite horizon dynamic programming to the case of state-dependent discounting. We obtain a condition on the discount factor process under which all of the standard optimality results can be recovered. We also show that the condition cannot be significantly weakened. Our framework is general enough to handle complications such as recursive preferences and unbounded rewards. Economic and financial applications are discussed. (C) 2021 Elsevie...
-
作者：Elliott, Matthew; Georg, Co-Pierre; Hazell, Jonathon
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Cape Town; Deutsche Bundesbank
摘要：Banks face different but potentially correlated risks from outside the financial system. Financial connections can share these risks, but they also create the means by which shocks can be propagated. We examine this tradeoff in the context of a new stylized fact we present: German banks are more likely to have financial connections when they face more similar risks. We develop a model that can rationalize such behavior. We argue that such patterns are socially suboptimal and raise systemic ris...
-
作者：Jovanovic, Boyan; Prat, Julien
作者单位：New York University; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris
摘要：Cyclical patterns in earnings can arise when contracts between firms and their workers are incomplete, and when workers cannot borrow or lend so as to smooth their consumption. Effort cycles generate occasional large changes in earnings. These large changes are transitory, consistent with recent empirical findings. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Malik, Komal; Mishra, Debasis
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles of objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the preferences of agents to be dichotomous. An agent with dichotomous preference partitions the set of bundles of objects as acceptable and unacceptable, and at the same payment level, she is indifferent between bundles in each class but strictly prefers acceptable to unacceptable bundles. We show that there is no Pareto efficient, dominant s...
-
作者：Mennle, Timo; Seuken, Sven
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting a dominant strategy for those agents whose preference intensities differ sufficiently between any two objects. We demonstrate that partial strategyproofness is axiomatically motivated and yields a parametric measure for how strategyproof an assignment m...
-
作者：Rossi, Stefano; Tinn, Katrin
作者单位：Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute; McGill University
摘要：We present a model where quantitative trading - trading strategies based on the quantitative analysis of prices, volumes, and other asset and market characteristics - is systematically profitable for sophisticated traders whose only source of private information is knowing better than other market participants how many fundamental traders, i.e., traders informed about fundamentals, are active in the market. In equilibrium, the direction of optimal quantitative trading depends on the number of ...
-
作者：Sadler, Evan
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Evidence suggests that individuals and firms are sometimes more innovative when subject to low-powered incentives. I offer an explanation based on a characteristic feature of creative work: hitting dead ends. An agent works on successive ideas, each of which may lead to a breakthrough with some probability. At any time, the agent may abandon her current idea, incurring delay to come up with a new one. Larger rewards and greater impatience cause the agent to spend more time on each idea and to ...
-
作者：Cole, Richard; Tao, Yixin
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency are two major goals in welfare economics. The existence of an allocation that satisfies both conditions has been studied for a long time. Whether items are indivisible or divisible, it is impossible to achieve envy-freeness and Pareto Efficiency ex post even in the case of two people and two items. In contrast, in this work, we prove that, for any cardinal utility functions (including complementary utilities for example) and for any number of items and playe...
-
作者：Della Lena, Sebastiano; Panebianco, Fabrizio
作者单位：University of Antwerp; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要：This paper introduces incomplete information into the standard cultural transmission framework (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). We consider parents having incomplete information about population shares and about the efficiency of their transmission technology. We show that conjectures about population shares are the key determinants of long-run population configurations. Namely, if these conjectures are positively or mildly negatively biased, there is always long-run cultural heterogeneity. If, inst...
-
作者：Milgrom, Paul; Mollner, Joshua
作者单位：Stanford University; Northwestern University
摘要：We introduce extended proper equilibrium, which refines proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978) by adding across-player restrictions on trembles. This refinement coincides with proper equilibrium in games with two players but adds new restrictions in games with three or more players. One implication of these additional restrictions is that any tremble that is costless in equilibrium is regarded by all as more likely than any costly tremble, even one by a different player. At least one extended prop...
