Sober optimism and the formation of international environmental agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Karp, Larry; Sakamoto, Hiroaki
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Kobe University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105321
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Environmental agreements; climate change; Dynamic game

摘要

We analyze a dynamic model of international environmental agreements where countries cannot make long-term commitments or use sanctions or rewards to induce cooperation. The equilibrium is a Markov chain, not a particular coalition. A large and effective coalition is an absorbing state, reached after a random succession of short-lived ineffective coalitions. Reaching such a coalition requires that the endogenous probability of success in any negotiating round is neither too small nor too large, a circumstance we describe as sober optimism: the understanding that cooperation is possible but not easy to achieve. An empirical application illustrates the importance of sober optimism in creating a climate agreement. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.