Information aggregation with runoff voting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Tsakas, Nikolas; Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105130
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Runoff voting; information aggregation; Partisan voters; Sequential elimination; Condorcet jury theorem

摘要

A majority of truth-seeking voters wants to choose the alternative that better matches the state of the world, but voters may disagree on which alternative is the best match due to private information. When we have an arbitrary number of alternatives and sophisticated partisan voters exist in the electorate, electing the correct alternative is challenging. We show that multi-round runoff voting achieves asymptotically full-information equivalence. That is, when the society is large, it can lead to the election of the correct alternative under fairly general assumptions regarding the information structure and partisans' preferences. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.