A solution to the two-person implementation problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laslier, Jean-Francois; Nunez, Matias; Sanver, M. Remzi
• 署名单位: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105261
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Nash implementation; Two players; Pareto efficiency

摘要

We propose strike mechanisms as a solution to the classical problem of Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1978) and Maskin (1999) according to which, in two-person societies, no Pareto efficient rule is Nashimplementable. A strike mechanism specifies the number of alternatives that each player vetoes. Each player simultaneously casts these vetoes and the mechanism selects randomly one alternative among the non-vetoed ones. For strict preferences over alternatives and under a very weak condition for extending preferences over lotteries, these mechanisms are deterministic-in-equilibrium. They Nash implement a class of Pareto efficient social choice rules called Pareto-and-veto rules. Moreover, under mild richness conditions on the domain of preferences over lotteries, any Pareto efficient Nash-implementable rule is a Pareto-and-veto rule and hence is implementable through a strike mechanism. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.