Organ donation with vouchers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kim, Jaehong; Li, Mengling; Xu, Menghan
• 署名单位: Xiamen University; Xiamen University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105159
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Organ donation; priority rule; voucher; Overlapping generation; public good; Health economics

摘要

The ever-increasing shortage of organs for transplantation has motivated many innovative policies to promote the supply of organs. This paper proposes and analyzes a general class of deceased organ allocation policies that assign priority on organ waiting lists to voucher holders to promote deceased donor registration. Priority vouchers can be obtained by self-registering for donation or through family inheritance. In an overlapping generations framework, we find that extending the donor priority benefits to future generations can improve the aggregate donation rate and social welfare. In particular, giving higher priority to voucher inheritors who register for donation is always beneficial regardless of the levels of population growth and care for future generations. By contrast, the efficacy of granting priority to nondonors with inherited vouchers depends on these two sociodemographic factors because of potential free-riding incentives. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.