Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Yingkai; Pei, Harry
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105222
• 发表日期: 2021
• 关键词: Reputation; Action frequency; BEHAVIOR; refinement; Concentration inequality

摘要

We examine a patient player's behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player's action frequencies in equilibrium. Our results clarify the extent to which reputations can refine the patient player's behavior and provide new insights to entry deterrence, business transactions, and capital taxation. Our proof makes a methodological contribution by establishing a new concentration inequality. (c) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.