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作者：Sargent, Thomas J.
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作者：Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan; Zhu, Yuxuan
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Peking University
摘要：The generalized multiple-prize nested lottery contest framework has been broadly applied to model noisy competitions that award prizes to multiple recipients. Assuming homogeneous and risk-neutral players, previous studies have typically solved for the symmetric strategy profile that satisfies the first-order condition as the equilibrium solution to the game. The literature has yet to formally establish equilibrium existence because of a technical challenge caused by the presence of multiple p...
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作者：Orlov, Dmitry
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：I consider a dynamic principal-agent model in which the agent does not observe the quality of his output and the principal chooses how much to monitor the agent. Monitoring improves production outcomes but can reduce the agent's incentive to work if it uncovers bad performance and leads to punishing the agent. The optimal monitoring intensity is path dependent: an agent who performed poorly in the past is monitored less going forward to reduce the risk of early termination. Conversely, an agen...
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作者：Xu, Jin; Zenou, Yves; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Shandong University; Monash University; Tsinghua University
摘要：We establish the general properties of equilibria (existence and uniqueness) in a very general model of interconnected multiplayer conflicts. In particular, under mild conditions on the cost function and the contest technology, we show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists and the set of Nash equilibria is convex. Furthermore, under the strong monotonicity of the cost function, the equilibrium is unique, regardless of the conflict structure. To establish these properties of equil...
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作者：Balbus, Lukasz; Reffett, Kevin; Wozny, Lukasz
作者单位：University of Zielona Gora; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Warsaw School of Economics
摘要：We prove existence of time consistent equilibria in a class of dynamic models with recursive payoffs and generalized discounting involving both behavioral and normative applications. Our generalized Bellman equation method identifies and separates both: recursive and strategic aspects of the equilibrium problem and allows to determine the sufficient assumptions on preferences and stochastic transition to establish existence. In particular we show existence of minimal state space stationary Mar...
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作者：Nishimura, Takeshi
作者单位：Komazawa University
摘要：We study bilateral trade with interdependent values as an informed-principal problem. The mechanism-selection game has multiple equilibria that differ with respect to principal's payoff and trading surplus. We characterize the equilibrium that is worst for every type of principal, and characterize the conditions under which there are no equilibria with different payoffs for the principal. We also show that this is the unique equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion. (C) 2022 Elsevier ...
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作者：Wang, Cheng; Yang, Youzhi
作者单位：Fudan University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study a dynamic principal-agent/firm-CEO relationship that is subject simultaneously to moral hazard, limited commitment, and shocks to the CEO's market value. Termination is used as (a) an incentive instrument to punish the CEO for bad performance, (b) a cost minimization device that uses the CEO's outside value as an external means for compensation, and (c) as a means for replacing the incumbent CEO with a less expensive new CEO. Termination occurs after the CEO receives either a sufficie...
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作者：Bikhchandani, Sushil; Mishra, Debasis
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are opti-mal for selling two identical, indivisible objects to a single buyer. We analyze two settings: (i) decreasing marginal values (DMV) and (ii) increasing marginal values (IMV). Thus, the values of the buyer for the two units are not independent.We show that under a well-known condition on distribu...
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作者：Saponara, Nick
摘要：We model a decision maker (DM) making a choice under uncertainty who faces constraints on the set of contingencies she can consider, or reason about, when evaluating a given act (a mapping from states to outcomes). We model the DM's ability to reason about (coarse) contingencies when evaluating a given act using partitions of the state space. A key feature of the model is that the partition may vary with the act the DM is evaluating. This feature allows us to model a DM who, despite her inabil...
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作者：Meissner, Thomas; Pfeiffer, Philipp
作者单位：Maastricht University; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：Timing premia measure how much consumption people are willing to forgo to resolve all consumption uncertainty immediately. We develop a novel experiment to elicit these attitudes directly in a model-free way. On average, subjects forgo around 5% of their total consumption to resolve all uncertainty immediately. Recursive utility models postulate a structural link between timing premia and deep preference parameters. We elicit these preference parameters separately and estimate corresponding pr...
