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作者：Fudenberg, Drew; Gao, Ying; Pei, Harry
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Northwestern University
摘要：We analyze situations where players build reputations for honesty rather than for playing particular actions. A patient player faces a sequence of short-run opponents. Before players act, the patient player announces their intended action after observing both a private payoff shock and a signal of what actions will be feasible that period. The patient player is either an honest type who keeps their word whenever their announced action is feasible, or an opportunistic type who freely chooses an...
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作者：Cheng, Ing-Haw; Hsiaw, Alice
作者单位：University of Toronto; Brandeis University
摘要：Why do individuals interpret the same information differently? We propose that individuals form beliefs following Bayes' Rule with one exception: when assessing the credibility of experts, they double-dip the data and use already-updated beliefs instead of their priors. This pre-screening mechanism explains why individuals jointly disagree about states of the world and the credibility of experts, why the ordering of signals and experts affects final beliefs, and when individuals over-or underr...
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作者：Han, Zhao; Tan, Fei; Wu, Jieran
作者单位：Saint Louis University; Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics; Zhejiang University; Zhejiang University
摘要：We propose an approach to solving and analyzing linear rational expectations models with general information frictions. Our approach is built upon policy function iterations in the frequency domain. We develop the theoretical framework of this approach using rational approximation, analytic continuation, and discrete Fourier transform. Conditional expectations, which are difficult to evaluate in the time domain, can be calculated efficiently in the frequency domain. We provide the numerical im...
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作者：Gong, Aibo; Ke, Shaowei; Qiu, Yawen; Shen, Rui
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：We study strategic trading with a market maker who does not know the joint distribution of public information and an asset's value, and hence cannot interpret information properly. Following a public event, a probabilistically informed trader who knows the distribution and liquidity traders trade. The market maker adopts a robust linear pricing strategy that has the best worst-case payoff guarantee. We show that such a strategy is equivalent to a two-step learning procedure, and characterize t...
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作者：Klibanoff, Peter; Mukerji, Sujoy; Seo, Kyoungwon; Stanca, Lorenzo
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：The alpha-MEU model and the smooth ambiguity model are two popular models in decision making under ambiguity. However, the axiomatic foundations of these two models are not completely understood. We provide axiomatic foundations of these models in a symmetric setting with a product state space S-infinity. This setting allows marginals over S to be linked behaviorally with (limiting frequency) events. Bets on such events are shown to reveal the i.i.d. measures that are relevant for the decision...
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作者：Luo, Yulei; Nie, Jun; Wang, Haijun
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Kansas City; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This paper studies how the two types of uncertainty due to ignorance, parameter and model uncertainty, jointly affect strategic consumption-portfolio rules, precautionary savings, and welfare. We incorporate these two types of uncertainty into a recursive utility version of a canonical Merton (1971) model with uninsurable labor income and unknown income growth, and derive analytical solutions and testable implications. We show that the interaction between the two types of uncertainty plays a k...
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作者：Orlov, Dmitry
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：Iconsider adynamic principal-agent model in which the agent does not observe the quality of his output and the principal chooses how much to monitor the agent. Monitoring improves production outcomes but can reduce the agent's incentive to work if it uncovers bad performance and lead stop unishing the agent. The optimal monitoring intensity is path dependent: anagent who performedpoorly in the pastis monitored less going forward to reduce the risk of early termination.Conversely,an agent who p...
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作者：Cho, Wonki Jo; Hafalir, Isa E.; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：Korea University; University of Technology Sydney; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：In school choice problems with weak priorities, the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism may pro-duce inefficient stable matchings due to tie-breaking. The stable-improvement-cycles (SIC) and choice -augmented deferred acceptance (CADA) mechanisms were proposed to remedy inefficiencies but they are manipulable. In a simple environment, we theoretically and experimentally analyze students' strategic be-havior when DA, SIC, and CADA are implemented. We show that obtaining the efficiency gain relat...
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作者：Kimya, Mert
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：We characterize the set of stable matchings when individuals are farsighted and when they choose their objections optimally along a farsighted objection path. We use a solution concept called maximal farsighted set (MFS), which is an adaptation of the concepts developed in Dutta and Vohra (2017) and Dutta and Vartiainen (2020) to one-to-one matching problems. MFS always exists, but it need not be unique. There is a unique largest MFS that contains all other, which is equal to the largest consi...
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作者：Giarlotta, Alfio; Petralia, Angelo; Watson, Stephen
作者单位：University of Catania; University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; York University - Canada
摘要：Most bounded rationality properties in the literature are inherited by subchoices, but are not satisfied by at least one subchoice of most choice functions. Therefore the fraction of choice functions that can be explained by these models goes to zero as the number of items tends to infinity. Numerical estimates confirm the rarity of bounded rationality even for small sets of alternatives.(c) 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (ht...
