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作者：Dong, Feng; Xu, Zhiwei
作者单位：Tsinghua University
摘要：We provide a theory to investigate the implications of time-varying bailout policy for rational bubbles in an infinite-horizon production economy. In particular, we ask two questions. First, should the government bailout asset bubbles? Second, if yes, how? In our model, firms face idiosyncratic investment opportunities and financial frictions, and creating new bubbles incurs real resources. Intrinsically useless assets can alleviate firms' credit constraints and enhance investment efficiency w...
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作者：Lavi, Ron; Shamash, Elisheva S.
作者单位：University of Bath; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：We study a complete information game with multiple principals and multiple common agents. Each agent takes an action that can affect the payoffs of all principals. Prat and Rustichini (2003) who introduce this model assume classic contracts: each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action taken by the agent. We define VCG contracts in which the monetary transfers to each agent additionally depend on all principals' offers, and study its effect on the existence ...
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作者：Dominiak, Adam; Tserenjigmid, Gerelt
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：In this paper, we study choice under growing awareness in the wake of new discoveries. The decision maker's behavior is described by two preference relations, one before and one after new discoveries are made. The original preference admits a subjective expected utility representation. As awareness grows, the original decision problem expands and so does the state space. Therefore, the decision maker's original preference has to be extended to a larger domain, and consequently the new preferen...
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作者：Phelan, Thomas; Toda, Alexis Akira
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We analyze equilibrium behavior and optimal policy within a Susceptible-Infected-Recovered epidemic model augmented with potentially undiagnosed agents who infer their health status and a social planner with imperfect enforcement of social distancing. We define and prove the existence of a perfect Bayesian Markov competitive equilibrium and contrast it with the efficient allocation subject to the same informa-tional constraints. We identify two externalities, static (individual actions affect ...
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作者：Brandl, Florian; Peters, Dominik
作者单位：University of Bonn; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：Approval voting allows every voter to cast a ballot of approved alternatives and chooses the alternatives with the largest number of approvals. Due to its simplicity and superior theoretical properties, it is a serious contender for use in real-world elections. We support this claim by giving eight characterizations of approval voting. All our results involve the consistency axiom, which requires choices to be consistent across different electorates. In addition, we consider strategyproofness,...
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作者：Lin, Yi-Hsuan
作者单位：Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：We consider a decision maker who first chooses a costly information structure, and then chooses an action after receiving a signal. The choice of action is observed, but the choice of information is not. Moreover, the state of nature is considered unobservable as well. In such a situation, the choice of action appears random and cannot be conditioned on the states from an outside analyst's point of view. We show that, given only stochastic choice from menus of actions, an analyst can identify ...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Auckland; University of Auckland; University of Auckland; University of Auckland
摘要：We model entry decisions of rival firms into a new market with uncertain common entry costs, potential product market competition, and experimentation. We show that a separating equilibrium, where firms enter only when they learn that the cost is low and are immediately followed by their rival, always exists. We also show the existence of pooling equilibria. In these equilibria, uninformed firms coordinate to enter at specific entry dates with positive probability and firms that learn that the...
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作者：Gorokhovsky, Alexander; Rubinchik, Anna
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Western Galilee Academic College
摘要：We propose a criterion for verifying whether an equilibrium of an overlapping-generations model is amenable to local policy analysis, i.e., is determinate. The criterion is applicable for a generic set of parameters of the model, and in case of indeterminacy, it indicates the nature of the problem: multiplicity of equilibria or their absence for near-by parameters. The criterion can be applied to models with infinite past and future as well as to those with a truncated past. The baseline equil...
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作者：Decamps, Jean-Paul; Villeneuve, Stephane
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study a dynamic model of a firm whose shareholders learn about its profitability and, face costs of external financing and costs of holding cash. The shareholders' problem involves a notoriously challenging singular stochastic control problem with a two-dimensional degenerate diffusion process. We solve it by means of an explicit construction of its value function, and derive a corporate life-cycle with two stages: a probation stage where it is never optimal for the firm to issue new shares...
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作者：Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R.
作者单位：Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Burgos; Universidad de Valladolid
摘要：We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new randomly drawn set of opponents. The revising agent then chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest in the test, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. Strict Nash equilibria are...
