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作者：Turchick, David; Xiong, Siyang; Zheng, Charles Z.
作者单位：Universidade de Sao Paulo; University of California System; University of California Riverside; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：One of the proofs in Xiong and Zheng (2007) has a subtle mistake. This note provides a simple correction without changing the structure of the proof or altering any assumption in the said paper. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Matsuyama, Kiminori; Ushchev, Philip
作者单位：Northwestern University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：In existing models of endogenous innovation cycles, market size alters the amplitude of fluctuations without changing the nature of fluctuations. This is due to the ubiquitous assumption of CES homothetic demand system, implying that monopolistically competitive firms sell their products at an exogenous markup rate in spite of the empirical evidence for the procompetitive effect of entry and market size. We extend the Judd model of endogenous innovation cycles to allow for the procompetitive e...
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作者：Alos-Ferrer, Carlos; Hofbauer, Josef
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Vienna
摘要：We present the family of Excess Payoff Dynamics for normal-form games, where the growth of a strategy depends only on its current proportion and the excess payoff, i.e., the payoff advantage of the strategy over the average population payoff. Requiring dependence only on the own excess payoff and a natural sign-preserving condition, the class essentially reduces to aggregate monotonic dynamics, a functional generalization of the Replicator Dynamics. However, Excess Payoff Dynamics also include...
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作者：Chen, Ying-Ju; Zenou, Yves; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Monash University; Tsinghua University
摘要：We develop a two-stage oligopolistic network competition model where, first, firms simultaneously de -termine their prices, and, second, consumers connected through a network determine their consumption. We show that firms price-discriminate consumers based on the consumer's network position. Denser networks (i.e., network topology) reduce prices, whereas increased competition (i.e., market structure) reduces prices only when competition is weak. However, the prices charged for the most influe...
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作者：Atayev, Atabek
摘要：In many markets buyers are poorly informed about which firms sell the product (product availability) and prices, and therefore have to spend time to obtain this information. In contrast, sellers typically have a better idea about which rivals offer the product. Information asymmetry between buyers and sellers on product availability, rather than just prices, has not been scrutinized in the literature on consumer search. We propose a theoretical model that incorporates this kind of information ...
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作者：Lopomo, Giuseppe; Rigotti, Luca; Shannon, Chris
作者单位：Duke University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We study surplus extraction in the general environment of McAfee and Reny (1992), and provide two alternative proofs of their main theorem. The first is an analogue of the classic argument of Cremer and McLean (1985, 1988), using geometric features of the set of agents' beliefs to construct a menu of contracts extracting the desired surplus. This argument, which requires a finite state space, also leads to a counterexample showing that full extraction is not possible without further significan...
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作者：Mackenzie, Andrew; Zhou, Yu
作者单位：Maastricht University; Kyoto University
摘要：We investigate menu mechanisms: dynamic mechanisms where at each history, an agent selects from a menu of his possible assignments. We consider both ex-post implementation and full implementation for a strengthening of dominance that covers off-path histories, and provide conditions under which menu mechanisms provide these implementations of rules. Our results cover a variety of environments, including matching with contracts, labor markets, auctions, school choice, marriage, object allocatio...
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作者：Fally, Thibault
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This paper examines demand systems where the demand for a good depends on other prices only through a common price aggregator (a scalar function of all prices). We refer to this property as generalized separability and provide the functional forms of demand that this property implies when demand is rational, i.e., derived from utility maximization. Generalized separability imposes restrictions on either income or price effects, and greater flexibility is obtained by adding indirect utility as ...
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作者：Frick, Mira; Iijima, Ryota; Le Yaouanq, Yves
作者单位：Yale University; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; University of Munich; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We show how incorporating Gilboa et al.'s (2010) notion of objective rationality into the a-MEU model of choice under ambiguity can overcome several challenges faced by the baseline model without objective rationality. The decision-maker (DM) has a subjectively rationalpreference greater than or similar to(Lambda)which captures the complete ranking over acts the DM expresses when forced to make a choice; in addition, we endow the DM with a (possibly incomplete) objectively rationalpreference g...
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作者：Cres, Herve; Tvede, Mich
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of East Anglia
摘要：We study the formation of opinions in a bipartite network of firms' boards and directors theoretically. A director and a board are connected provided the director is a board member. Opinions are sets of beliefs about the likelihood of different states of the world tomorrow. Our basic assumption is that boards as well as directors aggregate opinions of each other: a production plan is better than another for a board (director) provided every director (board of which she is a member) finds it be...
