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作者：Yegane, Ece
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We model a decision maker who observes available alternatives according to a list and stochastically forgets some alternatives. Each time the decision maker observes an item in the list, she recalls previous alternatives with some probability, conditional on those alternatives being recalled until this point. The decision maker maximizes a preference relation over the set of alternatives she can recall. We show that if every available alternative is chosen with strictly positive probability, t...
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作者：Kapicka, Marek; Rupert, Peter
作者单位：Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：The COVID-19 pandemic has killed millions across the globe and government responses have led to tens of millions of jobs lost. This paper combines the SIR epidemic model with a frictional labor market to examine the interaction between infection, wages and unemployment.The labor market is not efficient during the pandemic. Optimal policies show that it is often optimal to shut down businesses and impose a quarantine before the pandemic peaks. A quarantine itself is not enough, however, and mus...
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作者：Li, Jian; Zhou, Junjie; Chen, Ying-Ju
作者单位：Iowa State University; Tsinghua University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper studies the value of network-based targeting within a class of network games with strategic complements, where the designer can target a group of seed players as first movers. We define an effectiveness index, called the relative network synergy equivalent (RNSE), to quantify the effect of a network-based targeting intervention relative to across-the-board peer effect enhancement. We show that, regardless of the targeting policies and network structures, a universal and tight upper ...
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作者：Halim, Edward; Riyanto, Yohanes E.; Roy, Nilanjan
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We design an infinite-horizon dynamic asset market experiment with perishable consumption and a longlived asset where gains from trade originate from individuals experiencing idiosyncratic income shocks. Our study is based on the consumption-based general equilibrium theory (Lucas (1978)). The presence of traders having induced motive to smooth consumption is not sufficient to eliminate price bubbles. Despite the asset being consistently priced higher than the equilibrium price, traders are ab...
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作者：Pei, Harry
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A patient player privately observes a persistent state that directly affects his opponents' payoffs, and can be one of the several commitment types that plays the same mixed action in every period. I characterize the set of environments under which the patient player obtains at least his commitment payoff in all equilibria regardless of his stage-game payoff function. Due to the presence of interdependent values, the patient player cannot guarantee his mixed commitment payoff by imitating the ...
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作者：Morgan, John; Tumlinson, Justin; Vardy, Felix
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Exeter; University of Munich; International Monetary Fund
摘要：We show that meritocracy, in the sense of accuracy of performance ranking, can be too much of a good thing: in contests with sufficiently homogeneous agents, it reduces output and is Pareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement and complacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy may be optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Szydlowski, Martin; Yoon, Ji Hee
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study a continuous-time principal-agent model in which the principal is ambiguity averse about the agent's effort cost. The robust contract generates a seemingly excessive pay-performance sensitivity. The worst-case effort cost is high after good performance, but low after bad performance, which leads to overcompensation and undercompensation respectively and provides a new rationale for performance-sensitive debt. We also characterize the agent's incentives when the contract is misspecifie...
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作者：Giordani, Paolo E.; Mariani, Fabio
作者单位：Luiss Guido Carli University; Luiss Guido Carli University; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：This paper provides a rationale for the revival of protectionism, based on the rise of the educated class. In a trade model with heterogeneous workers and entrepreneurs, globalization generates aggregate gains but has distributional effects, which can be attenuated through taxation. By playing a two-stage political game, citizens decide on trade openness and the extent of redistribution. In this setting, trade liberalization is politically viable as long as the losers from trade are compensate...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Muir, Ellen, V; Taylor, Peter G.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Stanford University; University of Melbourne
摘要：Traders that arrive over time give rise to a dynamic tradeoff between the benefits of increasing gains from trade by accumulating traders and the associated cost of delay due to discounting. We analyze this tradeoff in a dynamic bilateral trade model in which a buyer and seller arrive in each period and draw their types independently from commonly known distributions. With symmetric binary types, the optimal market clearing policy can be implemented with posted prices and ex post budget balanc...
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作者：Kuelpmann, Philipp; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Graz
摘要：We collected data on one-shot play for a representative selection of two-player two-and three-strategy games with unique and completely mixed strategy predictions and propose a new method to compare theo-ries of one-shot play out of treatment that allows a direct likelihood comparison: Competing theories are calibrated with pre-existing data using different games and subjects. Most theories in most treatments have predictive power. No theory is uniformly best. Considering risk aversion signifi...
