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作者：Chen, Ying; Zapal, Jan
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences
摘要：To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from q committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes. The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy passes or paid up front. With transfer promises, the policy passes in equilibrium when the leader's gain from the policy is larger than the sum of the losses of the q members least opposed to the policy. Under non-unanimity rule, if the members are patient enough, the paymen...
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作者：Hu, Ju; Zhou, Zhen
作者单位：Peking University; Tsinghua University
摘要：We study information disclosure as a policy tool to minimize welfare losses in epidemics through mitigating healthcare congestion. We present a stylized model of a healthcare congestion game to show that congestion occurs when individuals expect the disease to be sufficiently severe and this leads to misallocation of scarce healthcare resources. Compared to full disclosure, under which congestion occurs when the true severity level surpasses the exhaustion level, a censorship policy, which poo...
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作者：Gehrig, Thomas; Ritzberger, Klaus
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Vienna; University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：This paper analyzes the role of intermediaries in providing immediacy in fast markets. Fast markets are modelled as contests with the possibility of multiple winners where the probability of casting the best quote depends on prior technology investments. Depending on the market design, equilibrium pricing by intermediaries involves a trade-off, between monopolistic price distortion and excess volatility. Since equilibrium at the pricing stage generates an externality, investments into faster t...
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作者：Tan, Serene
作者单位：National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper proposes a theory endogenizing the market structure when buyers' incomes are heterogeneous. Using a directed search model, ex ante identical firms choose the product quality of a good to sell and the target audience it wants to sell to, knowing only the income distribution of buyers. I show how the income distribution of buyers matters in determining the market structure. Segmentation of the product market by buyer income type can be obtained as an equilibrium phenomenon, but need n...
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作者：Balzer, Benjamin; Rosato, Antonio; von Wangenheim, Jonas
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Queensland; University of Naples Federico II; University of Bonn
摘要：We study Dutch and first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders and show that the strategic equivalence between these formats no longer holds. Intuitively, as the Dutch auction unfolds, a bidder becomes more optimistic about her chances of winning; this stronger attachment effect pushes her to bid more aggressively than in the first-price auction. Thus, Dutch auctions raise more revenue than first-price ones. Indeed, the Dutch auction raises the most revenue among standard ...
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作者：Gieczewski, German
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：This paper models the diffusion of verifiable information on a network populated by biased agents. Some agents, who are exogenously informed, choose whether to inform their neighbors. Informing a neighbor affects her behavior, but also enables her to inform others. Agents cannot lie; they can, however, feign ignorance. The model yields three main results. First, unless a large set of agents is initially informed, learning is incomplete. Second, full learning is more likely for moderate than fo...
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作者：Gerardi, Dino; Grillo, Edoardo; Monzon, Ignacio
作者单位：Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin; University of Padua
摘要：Decision makers often rely on experts' evaluations to decide on complex proposals. Proponents want the approval of their proposals and can work to improve their quality. The scrutiny of experts ought to push proponents to work harder, leading to high-quality proposals. Experts, however, have their own agendas: they may favor or oppose the proposals under their scrutiny. We study how the expert's agenda affects the likelihood that proposals are approved and their quality. We show that an expert...
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作者：Jin, Gu; Zhu, Tao
作者单位：Central University of Finance & Economics; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Real effects of long-run inflation are studied in a standard matching model of money. Depending on the underlying policy, inflation can increase output but decrease ex ante social welfare or can do the opposite. Inflation makes the distribution of wealth more concentrated at the very top. When facing a potential policy change, the poor are much more sensitive to which policy may be adopted than the rich. Decentralized trade plays a critical role in these findings by amplifying the individual r...
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作者：Gilboa, Itzhak; Samuelson, Larry; Schmeidler, David
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Tel Aviv University; Yale University
摘要：Beginning with Robert Aumann's 1976 Agreeing to Disagree result, a collection of papers have established conditions under which it is impossible for rational agents to disagree, or bet against each other, or speculate in markets. The subsequent literature has provided many explanations for disagreement and trade, typically exploiting differences in prior beliefs or information processing. We view such differences as arising most naturally in a large worlds setting, where there is no commonly-a...
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作者：Dasgupta, Ani; Ghosh, Sambuddha
作者单位：Massachusetts System of Public Higher Education; Massachusetts Maritime Academy; Boston University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We propose a simple geometric construct called 'self-accessibility' to study discounted infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring. Self-accessibility delivers payoffs by computing action paths that keep all continuation payoff vectors close to the target payoff. It unifies the analysis of games with symmetric and asymmetric discounting, dispenses with public randomization, and generates pure on-path strategies. We first use it to simplify Fudenberg and Maskin (1986, 1991) and generaliz...
