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作者：Horan, Sean; Manzini, Paola; Mariotti, Marco
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; University of Bristol; IZA Institute Labor Economics; University of London; Queen Mary University London; Deakin University
摘要：In a variety of choice environments, perception is both noisy and coarse. That is, the agent perceives the true ranking of the objects of choice with error; and, in addition, the perceived values can only be discriminated coarsely. Reasons for coarse perception include limitations in sensory perception, memory function, or the communication technology used by expert advisors. We model these two sources of error in terms of a random utility model with a discrimination threshold. In the limiting...
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作者：Luo, Xiao; Qiao, Yongchuan; Sun, Yang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University of Electronic Science & Technology of China; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要：Dhillon and Mertens (1996) introduce the concept of perfect correlated equilibrium (PCE) and show, using an example, that the revelation principle fails for PCE -that is, a PCE distribution may not be generated by the canonical mechanism. This failure of the revelation principle jeopardizes its applications in economics. In this paper, we show that the revelation principle holds for an alternative notion of perfect correlated equilibrium that we dub correlated equilibrium with message-dependen...
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作者：Pivato, Marcus
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：How should we aggregate the ex ante preferences of Bayesian agents with heterogeneous beliefs? Suppose the state of the world is described by a random process that unfolds over time. Different agents have different beliefs about the probabilistic laws governing this process. As new information is revealed over time by the process, agents update their beliefs and preferences via Bayes rule. Consider a Pareto principle that applies only to preferences which remain stable in the long run under th...
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作者：da Costa, Carlos E.; Maestri, Lucas J.; Santos, Marcelo R.
作者单位：Insper
摘要：We study distributive and insurance policies in frictional labor markets where workers are privately informed about their abilities. The combination of selection and moral hazard constraints demands the use of new tax instruments that are redundant in frictionless labor markets to target vacancy creation. We characterize efficient allocations and derive new optimality conditions on effort and employment probability wedges. Wedges on both effort and vacancy creation are always positive at the b...
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作者：Mengel, Friederike; Orlandi, Ludovica; Weidenholzer, Simon
作者单位：University of Essex; Lund University; Nottingham Trent University; Lund University; Nottingham Trent University
摘要：Experimental studies of infinitely repeated games typically consist of several indefinitely repeated games (matches) played in sequence with different partners each time, whereby match length, i.e. the number of stages of each game is randomly determined. Using a large meta data set on indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games (Dal Bo and Frechette, 2018) we demonstrate that the realized length of early matches has a substantial impact on cooperation rates in subsequent matches. We estima...
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作者：Werner, Jan
摘要：Ambiguous beliefs may lead to speculative trade and speculative bubbles. We demonstrate this by showing that the classical Harrison and Kreps (1978) example of speculative trade among agents with heterogeneous beliefs can be replicated with agents having common but ambiguous beliefs. More precisely, we show that the same asset prices and pattern of trade can be obtained in equilibrium with agents' having recursive multiple-prior expected utilities with common set of priors. While learning abou...
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作者：Liu, Shuo; Migrow, Dimitri
作者单位：Peking University; University of Edinburgh
摘要：We revisit the classic problem of optimally allocating decision rights in a multi-divisional organization. To be able to adapt its decisions to local conditions, the organization has to rely on self-interested division managers to collect and disseminate the relevant information. We show that if division managers are certain about how the headquarter (HQ) weights each division's performance, centralization may always dominate decentralization in generating information, and therefore even lead ...
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作者：Liu, Zehao; Sinclair, Andrew J.
作者单位：Renmin University of China; University of Hong Kong; California Institute of Technology
摘要：We propose a model of collateralized lending in which (1) borrowers endogenously determine collateral quality and (2) lenders can produce costly information about collateral payoffs. Our model yields several novel predictions: wealthier economies use lower quality collateral in equilibrium, have more severe finan-cial crises, and have less frequent crises. We provide both micro and macro empirical evidence. In the U.S. mortgage market wealthier lenders accept lower quality collateral, and, loo...
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作者：Chakravarty, Surajeet; Kelsey, David; Teitelbaum, Joshua C.
作者单位：University of Exeter; University of Nottingham; Georgetown University
摘要：Karni and Vier empty set (2013) propose a model of belief revision under growing awareness-reverse Bayesianism-which posits that as a person becomes aware of new acts, consequences, or act-consequence links, she revises her beliefs over an expanded state space in a way that preserves the relative likelihoods of events in the original state space. A key feature of the model is that reverse Bayesianism does not fully determine the revised probability distribution. We provide an assumption-act in...
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Mueller-Frank, Manuel; Pai, Mallesh M.
作者单位：National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Rice University
摘要：We investigate how a principal's knowledge of agents' higher-order beliefs impacts their ability to robustly implement a given social choice function. We adapt a formulation of Oury and Tercieux (2012): a social choice function is continuously implementable if it is partially implementable for types in an initial model and nearby types. We characterize when a social choice function is truthfully continuously implementable, i.e., using game forms corresponding to direct revelation mechanisms fo...
