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作者：Balbuzanov, Ivan
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：This paper generalizes the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) to matching markets with arbitrary constraints. The constraints are modeled as a set of permissible ex post allocations. A result of independent interest gives a simple geometric characterization of all lotteries over the set of permissible allocations: they are the ones that satisfy a collection of simple and tractable linear inequalities determined by the constraints. The inequalities correspond t...
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作者：Dong, Ding; Liu, Zheng; Wang, Pengfei; Zha, Tao
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta; Emory University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Housing demand shocks in standard macroeconomic models are a primary source of house price fluctuations, but those models have difficulties in generating the observed large volatility of house prices relative to rents. We provide a microeconomic foundation for the reduced-form housing demand shocks with a tractable heterogenous-agent framework. In our model with heterogeneous beliefs, an expansion of credit supply raises housing demand of optimistic buyers and boosts house prices without affec...
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作者：Pivato, Marcus
作者单位：Universite Bourgogne Europe; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：Let X be a connected metric space, and let >= be a weak order defined on a suitable subset of X-N. We characterize when >= has a Cesaro average utility representation. This means that there is a continuous real-valued function u on X such that, for all sequences x = (x(n))(n=1)(infinity) and y = (y(n))(n=1)(infinity) in the domain of >=, we have x >= y if and only if the limit as N ->infinity of the average value of u(x(1)), ...,u(x(N)) is higher than limit as N ->infinity of the average value...
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作者：Jeon, Jee Seon; Hwang, Ilwoo
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We study an infinite-horizon multilateral bargaining game in which the status quo policy, players' recognition probabilities, and their voting weights are endogenously determined by the previous bargaining outcome. With players not discounting future payoffs, we show that the long-run equilibrium outcome features the concentration of power by one or two players, depending on the initial bargaining state. If the players' initial shares are relatively equal, they successfully prevent tyranny, bu...
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作者：Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We suggest a framework to analyse how sophisticated decision makers combine multiple sources of information to form predictions. In particular, we focus on situations in which: (i) Decision makers un-derstand each information source in isolation but are uncertain about the correlation between the sources; (ii) Decision makers consider a range of bounded correlation scenarios to yield a set of possible predic-tions; (iii) Decision makers face ambiguity in relation to the set of predictions they...
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作者：Do, Jihwan
作者单位：Wuhan University
摘要：This paper provides a theoretical explanation of cheating and compensation on-path of play using a canonical repeated game model of price-fixing collusion. The novel mechanism relies on firms playing mixed strategies allowing for both the monopoly price and undercutting the monopoly price to happen with positive probability, together with a compensation scheme that punishes a price-cutter. For an intermediate range of discount factors, the mechanism is optimal in a restricted class of equilibr...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.; Kojima, Fuhito; Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Tokyo; Boston College
摘要：Interdistrict school choice programs-where a student can be assigned to a school outside of her district-are widespread in the US. We introduce a model of interdistrict school choice and present mechanisms that produce stable assignments. We consider four categories of policy goals on assignments and identify when the mechanisms can achieve them. By introducing a novel framework of interdistrict school choice, we provide a new avenue of research in market design. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rig...
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作者：Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Gulen, Huseyin; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Ozbay, Erkut Y.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We investigate experimentally preferences between different ambiguous processes generated by two-color Ellsberg urns. By providing symmetric information on urns with different numbers of beads and keeping the information on the most optimistic, pessimistic, and equal probability of winning possibilities the same, we elicit subjects' preferences for the size of an ambiguous urn. Subjects prefer the bets from the ambiguous urns with more beads. We analyze the role of ambiguity aversion and ratio...
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作者：Clark, Daniel; Fudenberg, Drew; He, Kevin
作者单位：Yale University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of forward induction, because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play, and may not have enough data to rule out a strategy that opponents never use. Learning models also do not support the idea that the selected equilibria should only depend on a game's reduced normal form. However, playing the extensive form of a game is equival...
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作者：Kaya, Ayca; Vereshchagina, Galina
作者单位：University of Miami; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We analyze the optimal sorting of experts who differ in their ability to acquire information, into production teams. Once a team is formed, experts individually acquire information about the joint project, communicate the information they acquired, and then engage in team production. Misalignment of preferences at the production stage creates incentives for belief manipulation at the communication stage. We show that the cost associated with misaligned incentives is minimized if experts of sim...
