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作者：Gomes, Joao F.; Grotteria, Marco; Wachter, Jessica A.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of London; London Business School
摘要：Large crises tend to follow rapid credit expansions. Causality, however, is far from obvious. We show how this pattern arises naturally when financial intermediaries optimally exploit economic rents that drive their franchise value. As this franchise value fluctuates over the business cycle, so too do the incentives to engage in risky lending. The model leads to novel insights on the effects of unconventional monetary policies in developed economies. We argue that bank lending might have respo...
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作者：Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar; Dziubinski, Marcin
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; University of Warwick; University of Warsaw
摘要：We consider a problem of mechanism design without money, where a planner selects a winner among a set of agents with binary types and receives outside signals (like the report of external referees). We show that there is a gap between the optimal Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible (DSIC) mechanism and the optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) mechanism. In the optimal BIC mechanism, the planner can leverage the outside signal to elicit information about agents' types. BIC mechanisms ...
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作者：Fernandez-Villaverde, Jesus; Sanches, Daniel
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia
摘要：We present a micro-founded monetary model of a small open economy to examine the behavior of money, prices, and output under the gold standard. In particular, we formally analyze Hume's celebrated price-specie flow mechanism. Our framework incorporates the influence of international trade on the money supply in the Home country through gold flows. In the short run, a positive correlation exists between the quantity of money and the price level. Additionally, we demonstrate that money is non-ne...
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作者：Schaal, Edouard; Taschereau-Dumouchel, Mathieu
作者单位：ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Cornell University
摘要：This paper explores whether rational herding can generate endogenous aggregate fluctuations. We embed a tractable model of rational herding into a business cycle framework. In the model, technological inno-vations arrive with unknown qualities, and agents have dispersed information about how productive the technology really is. Rational investors decide whether to invest based on their private information and the investment behavior of others. Herd-driven boom-bust cycles arise endogenously in...
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作者：Basteck, Christian; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening the first requirement to q-unanimity - i.e., when every agent ranks a different object at the top, then each agent shall receive his most-preferred object with probability of at least q - we show that a mechanism satisfying strategy-proofness, envy-freeness and ex-post weak non-wastefulness can be...
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作者：Eilat, Ran; Neeman, Zvika
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study how the suspicion that communicated information might be deceptive affects the nature of what can be communicated in a sender-receiver game. Sender is said to deceive Receiver if she sends a message that induces a belief that is different from the belief that should have been induced in the realized state. Deception is costly to Sender and the cost is endogenous: it is increasing in the distance between the induced belief and the belief that should have been induced. A message functio...
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作者：Sano, Ryuji
作者单位：Yokohama National University
摘要：This study examines auctions in which the value of goods is endogenously determined by ex post in-vestment while bidders face financial constraints. The main results are twofold. First, we characterize performance comparisons on revenue and investment between standard auctions. When the valuation is linear in investment, we have the equivalence theorem with respect to the seller's expected revenue and the winner's expected investment. When the valuation is concave in investment, the first-pric...
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作者：Akyol, Ethem
作者单位：TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji University
摘要：We study the problem of allocating n objects to n agents without monetary transfers in a setting where each agent's preference over objects is private. We assume that each agent's value vector (values for n objects) is independently drawn from an exchangeable distribution and show that the celebrated Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism is welfare inferior to another allocation method, the Random Boston mechanism, when the number of agents and objects is large. Specifically, every type of ever...
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作者：Weng, Xi; Wu, Fan; Yin, Xundong
作者单位：Peking University; California Institute of Technology; Central University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study signaling games with quadratic payoffs. As signaling games admit multiple separating equilibria, many equilibrium selection rules are proposed and a well-known solution is Riley equilibria. They are separating equilibria in which the sender achieves the highest equilibrium payoff for all types among all separating equilibria. We analyze the conditions for Riley equilibria to be linear, a common assumption in many applications. We derive a sufficient and necessary condition for the exi...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：University of London; University of London Institute in Paris; Yale University
摘要：We offer an approach to cooperation in repeated games of private monitoring in which players construct models of their opponents' behavior by observing the frequencies of play in a record of past plays of the game in which actions but not signals are recorded. Players construct models of their opponent's behavior by grouping the histories in the record into a relatively small number of analogy classes for which they estimate probabilities of cooperation. The incomplete record and the limited n...
