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作者：Parakhonyak, Alexei; Vikander, Nick
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford; University of Copenhagen
摘要：We show that a firm may benefit from strategically creating scarcity for its product, in order to trigger herding behaviour from consumers in situations where such behaviour is otherwise unlikely. We consider a setting with social learning, where consumers observe sales from previous cohorts and update beliefs about product quality before making their purchase. Imposing a capacity constraint directly limits sales but also makes information coarser for consumers, who react favourably to a sell-...
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作者：Polanski, Arnold; Vega-Redondo, Fernando
作者单位：University of East Anglia; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We study how learning and influence co-evolve in a social network by extending the classical model of DeGroot (1974) in two fundamental ways: (a) opinions are multidimensional and the learning time-span is arbitrary; (b) the effective social network is endogenously shaped by opinion-based homophily. Our analysis starts by establishing the existence of an equilibrium where, following (a)-(b), the learning outcome and the social network are jointly determined. This is followed by its characteriz...
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作者：Banerjee, Snehal; Breon-Drish, Bradyn; Kaniel, Ron; Kremer, Ilan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Rochester; Fudan University; Reichman University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Warwick
摘要：Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of information which is subsumed by a later announcement? We consider a model in which the firm's manager can choose to disclose short-term information which becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are sufficiently low, the manager discloses even if she only cares about the long-term price of the firm. Intuitively, by disclosing, she causes early investors to trade less aggressively, reducing price informativeness, which in turn increa...
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作者：Flynn, Joel P.; Sastry, Karthik A.
摘要：To study the equilibrium implications of decision frictions, we introduce a new class of control costs in continuum-player, continuum-action games in which agents interact via an aggregate of the actions of others. The costs that we study accommodate a rich class of decision frictions, including ex post misop-timization, imperfect ex ante planning, cognitive constraints that depend endogenously on the behavior of others, and consideration sets. We provide primitive conditions such that equilib...
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作者：Biswas, Sonny
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：I analyze a novel spillover effect from collateralized to uncollateralized loans. High-type borrowers have good projects, while low-type borrowers do not know their project quality. High-type borrowers post collateral, and a monopolist bank screens only low-type borrowers ' projects. Different from existing models, equilibrium collateral requirements are stricter than the minimum necessary to achieve separation, even if collateral is costly. When high-type borrowers post more collateral, the b...
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作者：Ma, Zizhen
作者单位：Wuhan University
摘要：This paper studies majoritarian reputational bargaining. Three agents bargain over the division of one dollar under majority rule, and proposers are randomly chosen. Each agent has private information about whether she is a rational type that maximizes her expected share of the dollar or an obstinate type that commits to claiming a certain share of the dollar. Efficiency and surplus distribution in majoritarian reputational bargaining may differ from their counterparts in bilateral reputationa...
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作者：Cetemen, Doruk; Feng, Felix Zhiyu; Urgun, Can
作者单位：City St Georges, University of London; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Princeton University
摘要：This paper studies a continuous-time, finite-horizon contracting problem with renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency arising from non-exponential discounting. The problem is formulated as a dynamic game played among the agent, the principal and their respective future selves, each with their own discount function. We identify the principal optimal renegotiation-proof contract as a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of the game, prove that such an MPE exists, and characterize the optimal contrac...
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作者：Won, Dong Chul
作者单位：Ajou University
摘要：This paper investigates the uniqueness of equilibrium in the economy where agents have preferences with possibly distinct levels of relative risk aversion. Equilibrium prices exist in a price range determined by micro and macroeconomic information. Macroeconomic information is inferred from two representativeagent economies, which provide lower and upper bounds on aggregate demand, respectively. Analysis of the first and second-order price effects shows that individual demand has a unique infl...
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作者：Bich, Philippe; Teteryatnikova, Mariya
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：We extend standard tools from equilibrium refinement theory in non-cooperative games to a coopera-tive framework of network formation. First, we introduce the new concept of perfect pairwise stability. It transposes the idea of trembling hand perfection to network formation theory and strictly refines the pairwise stability concept of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Second, we study basic properties of perfect pairwise stability: existence, admissibility and perturbation. We further show that our...
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作者：Kops, Christopher; Pasichnichenko, Illia
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：The standard Subjective Expected Utility model of decision-making implies that information can never have a negative value ex-ante. Many ambiguity theories have since questioned this property. We provide an experimental test of the connection between the value of information and ambiguity attitude. Our results show that the value of information can indeed be negative when new information renders hedging against ambiguity impossible. Moreover, the value of information is correlated with ambigui...
