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作者：Albrecht, James; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan
作者单位：Georgetown University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Peking University; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：The literature offers two interpretations of competitive search equilibrium, one based on a Nash approach and the other on a market-maker approach. When each buyer visits only one seller, the two approaches are equivalent. However, when each buyer visits multiple sellers, this equivalence can break down. We present a model in which every buyer visits 2 sellers. A buyer who trades with one seller receives a value of s, while a buyer who trades with 2 sellers receives value 1. Letting s vary fro...
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作者：Li, Fei; Song, Yangbo; Zhao, Mofei
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Beihang University
摘要：We study adversarial information design in a regime-change context. A continuum of agents simultane-ously chooses whether to attack the current regime. The attack succeeds if and only if the mass of attackers outweighs the regime's strength. A designer manipulates information about the regime's strength to main-tain the status quo. Our optimal information structure exhibits local obfuscation: some agents receive a signal matching the regime's true strength, and others receive an elevated signa...
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作者：Vaccari, Federico
作者单位：University of Bergamo
摘要：This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation. The main result concerns the characterization of equilibria with desirable properties: they always exist, are essentially unique, and are robust. Information transmission is partial in these equilibria, and persuasion occurs on the equilibrium path. By contra...
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作者：Keister, Todd; Mitkov, Yuliyan
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Camden; Rutgers University New Brunswick; University of Bonn
摘要：We study the interaction between the government's bailout policy and a bank's willingness to impose losses on (or bail in) investors based on its private information. In the absence of regulation, bail-ins in the early stages of a crisis are too small, while bailouts are too large and too frequent. Moreover, the bank may face a run by informed investors, creating further distortions and leading to a larger bailout. We show how a regulator with limited information can raise welfare and, in some...
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作者：Karantounias, Anastasios G.
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：This paper analyzes optimal policy in setups where both the policymaker and the private sector have doubts about the probability model of uncertainty and form endogenous worst-case beliefs. There are two forces that shape optimal policy results: a) the manipulation of the endogenous beliefs of the private sector so that the forward-looking constraints that the policymaker is facing are relaxed, b) the discrepancy (if any) in pessimistic beliefs between a paternalistic policymaker and the priva...
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作者：McAdams, David; Song, Yangbo; Zou, Dihan
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：During an infectious-disease epidemic, people make choices that impact transmission, trading off the risk of infection with the social-economic benefits of activity. We investigate how the qualitative features of an epidemic's Nash-equilibrium trajectory depend on the nature of the economic benefits that people get from activity. If economic benefits do not depend on how many others are active, as usually modeled, then there is a unique equilibrium trajectory, the epidemic eventually reaches a...
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作者：Zhu, Shuguang
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：This study examines a mechanism design problem where the principal can affect the agents' knowledge of a payoff-relevant state, namely, the principal designs and commits to an information disclosure policy that generates agent-specific private signals, while the principal directly observes neither the state nor the signal profile. We solve this problem by constructing a novel class of disclosure policies that exhibit individually uninformative, aggregately revealing, and immune to unilateral m...
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作者：Solan, Eilon; Zhao, Chang
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of International Business & Economics
摘要：We consider a dynamic inspection problem between a principal and several agents. The principal ob-serves the full inspection history, whereas each agent only observes inspections imposed on himself. When inspection resources are limited, the inspection intensities for agents are negatively correlated, and hence each agent cares not only about his own inspection history, but also about the inspection histories of the other agents. In such cases, should the principal publicly reveal past inspect...
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作者：Blume, Andreas; Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：University of Arizona; Lehigh University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：We experimentally compare mediated (cheap) talk with direct (cheap) talk. Theory, guided by a char-acterization of equilibria in both environments, suggests that mediated talk has the potential to improve information sharing and welfare relative to direct talk. We sharpen the theory prediction by invoking Craw-ford's (2003) language-anchored level-k analysis. In the experiment, we find that mediated talk can indeed facilitate information transmission. We also find, however, that this requires ...
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作者：Harstad, Bard
摘要：This paper presents a novel dynamic bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own con-tribution, before all pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance for delay, each equilibrium pledge maximizes an asymmetric Nash product. The weights on others' payoffs increase in the uncertainty, but decrease in the correlation of the shocks. The weights vary pledge to pledge, and this implies that the outcome is generically inefficient. The Nash demand game an...
