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作者：Roy, Nilanjan
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We design an experiment to study the implications of allowing players to revise their actions in a Cournot duopoly game. Payoffs are determined only by the quantities selected at the end in a real-time revision game. On the other hand, in a stochastic revision game, opportunities to adjust quantities arrive randomly, and the quantities selected at the last revision opportunity are implemented. Contrasting results emerge: while real-time revision results in choices that are more competitive tha...
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作者：Matyskova, Ludmila; Montes, Alfonso
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Universidad de Chile; Universitat d'Alacant; Universidad de Chile
摘要：We consider a Bayesian persuasion model, in which the receiver can gather independent information about the state at a uniformly posterior-separable cost. We show that the sender provides information that prevents the receiver from gathering independent information in equilibrium. When the receiver faces a lower cost of information, her 'threat' of gathering independent information increases, thus decreasing the sender's power to persuade. Lower cost of information can also hurt the receiver, ...
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作者：Chen, Jun; Elliott, Matthew; Koh, Andrew
作者单位：Renmin University of China; University of Cambridge; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The past twenty years have witnessed the emergence of internet conglomerates fueled by acquisitions. We build a simple model of network formation to study this. Following the resource-based view of competitive advantage from the management literature we endow firms with capabilities which drive their competitive-ness across markets. Firms can merge to combine their capabilities, spin-off new firms by partitioning their capabilities, or procure unassigned capabilities. We study stable industry ...
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作者：Meisner, Vincent; von Wangenheim, Jonas
作者单位：Technical University of Berlin; University of Bonn
摘要：Evidence suggests that participants in strategy-proof matching mechanisms play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria. We find that non-truthful preference submissions can be strictly optimal if and only if they are top-rank monotone. In equilibrium, inefficiency or justified envy may arise in seemingly stable or efficient mechanisms. Specifically, students who ...
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作者：Lou, Youcheng; Rahi, Rohit
作者单位：Chinese Academy of Sciences; Academy of Mathematics & System Sciences, CAS; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study the market for a risky asset in which traders are heterogeneous both in terms of their value for the asset and the information that they have about this value. Traders behave strategically and use the equilibrium price to extract information that is relevant to them. Due to adverse selection, uninformed traders are less willing than the informed to provide liquidity. We evaluate the impact of a change in the size or composition of the investor population on price informativeness, liqu...
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作者：Marchiori, Carmen; Minelli, Enrico
作者单位：University of Brescia
摘要：Due to the public good nature of basic research, the mechanisms for rewarding talent are very different from those prevailing in the production of applied research by private actors. We develop a growth model in which such mechanisms are taken explicitly into account. This allows us to address the following fundamental questions: how do policies in the public research sector influence the effort and risk-taking decisions of researchers of different talent? How do these choices affect the aggre...
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作者：Kaas, Leo
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：Equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and aggregate uncertainty are difficult to analyze since policy functions and market prices usually depend on the cross-sectional distribution over agents' state variables which is a high-dimensional object. This paper considers a general model framework in which this curse of dimensionality does not arise because equilibrium prices are determined by market entry conditions and are independent of the cross-sectional distribution (block-recursive equ...
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作者：Hiller, Victor; Wu, Jiabin; Zhang, Hanzhe
作者单位：Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; University of Oregon; Michigan State University
摘要：Building on previous literature that examines the influence of intergenerational transmission in cultural evolution, we highlight the importance of the marriage market in the determination of cultural homogeneity (melting pot) versus heterogeneity (diversity). To do so, we characterize cultural evolutionary processes under different distributions of marital preferences and stable matching schemes. In our setting, cultural substitutability (Bisin and Verdier, 2001) is neither sufficient nor nec...
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作者：Yang, Erya; Kopylov, Igor
作者单位：Sun Yat Sen University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We propose a random quasi-linear utility model (RQUM) where quasi-linear utility functions are drawn randomly via some probability distribution pi, and utility ties are broken by a convenient lexicographic rule. We characterize RQUM and identify pi uniquely in terms of stochastic choice data. McFadden's (1973) additive random utility model is obtained as a special case where utility ties have a zero probability in all menus. Another distinct case of RQUM captures finite populations and derives...
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作者：Hebert, Benjamin; Woodford, Michael
作者单位：Stanford University; Columbia University
摘要：Decisions take time, and the time taken to reach a decision is likely to be informative about the cost of more precise judgments. We formalize this insight using a dynamic model of optimal evidence accumula-tion. We provide conditions under which the resulting belief dynamics resemble either diffusion processes or processes with large jumps. We then consider the in which discounting effects are small relative to the opportunity cost of time, and show that the state-contingent choice probabilit...
